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Introduction
The term "affirmative action" is a political lightning rod. A dis-
cussion of its merits is almost always heated, and accompanied by an
underlying consideration of the sensitive subjects of race and racism,
gender and sexism. Support for, or opposition to, affirmative action
has become a defining position for public figures. For example, oppo-
sition to affirmative action was a central theme of the recent presiden-
tial campaign of California Governor Pete Wilson, Senator Phil
Gramm, and columnist Pat Buchanan, and was initially one of the pri-
mary issues raised by the campaign of former Senator Robert Dole.'
Their rhetoric in the summer of 1995 led Vice-Presidential candidate
Jack Kemp, a long-time supporter of affirmative action, to warn then-
Senator Dole and the other Republican candidates that he might not
support the Republican presidential ticket.2 Democrats are expres-
sing concern that the Republican Party is using the issue as a "wedge"
in the campaign, while President Clinton's "Mend it-don't end it"
speech in support of affirmative action has been described as a defin-
ing moment in his campaign for re-election.3 Yet for all the debate
about affirmative action, there is little discussion, let alone agreement,
on what the term means.4 This Article is both an attempt to forge a
1. See Louis Freedberg, Dole Ready to Kill Affirmative Action, S.F. CHRON., July 27,
1995, at Al, All.
2. See Robert Novak, Kemp Wants No Part in Affirmative Action War, BUFFALO
NEWS, July 28, 1995, at 3C; Jake Thompson, Kansan Proposes Ending Federal Minority Set-
Asides, KANSAS CITY STAR, July 28, 1995, at A5; Steven A. Holmes, Preferences Are Split-
ting Republicans, N.Y. TIMEls, July 29, 1995, § 1, at 6. When Kemp accepted Dole's offer to
join the Republican ticket, he reversed his long-held position on affirmative action. See
Larry Margasak, Affirmative Action Foes Gain Ally: Jack Kemp, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 13,
1996, at Al.
3. Alison Mitchell, Clinton Regains His Voice with 3 Speeches, N.Y. TIMES, July 23,
1995, § 1 at 10.
4. "'Affirmative action' enjoys no clear and widely shared definition. This contrib-
utes to the confusion and miscommunication surrounding the issue." AFFIRMATIVE Ac-
TION RE iEW: REPORT TO TIE PRESIDENT 1 n.1 (1995). See also Louis Freedberg, Race,
Gender-UC Vote Didn't Clear The Air, S.F. CHRON., July 24, 1995, at Al, A9 ("For Gov-
ernor Wilson, it is reverse discrimination and 'the deadly virus of tribalism'; for Jackson, it
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clearer definition of affirmative action and an argument in support of
its continuation.
Part I is descriptive. It sets forth how affirmative action works in
the areas of employment, school admissions, and public contracting. I
suggest that affirmative action may be carried out through five princi-
pal methods.5 Method I, quotas, is the use of absolute floors or ceil-
ings for the selection of women or minorities. Quotas are the most
controversial, yet the least used, form of affirmative action. Under
current law, they are permitted only under highly unusual circum-
stances. Method II, preferences, allows the consideration of race, sex,
or ethnicity in making selections. Preferences are used only under
strict legal guidelines when necessary to counteract the effects of dis-
crimination. Method III, self-studies, is the examination by decision-
makers of how they select employees, contractors, or students. When
such studies reveal disparities between the race, sex, or ethnicity of
the available selection pool and the persons actually selected, they
may lead to the imposition of goals and timetables. These are used to
measure progress in eliminating discrimination or to equalize the
makeup of the workforce with the pool from which it is selected.
Method IV, outreach and counseling, is the use of targeted recruit-
ment to increase the pool of minority or women applicants from which
selections are made. Outreach and counseling programs are often
adopted as a result of self-studies which reveal disparities in the selec-
tion of minorities and women. Method V, anti-discrimination, is the
adoption of aggressive non-discrimination policies, such as diversity
training and anti-harassment training.
Part II analyzes the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
that have adjudicated various affirmative action plans. Although the
Court has never spoken with a single voice in this area, and has fre-
quently issued badly splintered decisions, some basic principles none-
theless emerge from its affirmative action decisions of the past
nineteen years. First, to the extent that affirmative action in employ-
ment and contracting includes race-conscious decisionmaking, 6 it is
is opportunity, hope, an 'even playing field'; for Clinton, it is a flawed but essential tool
that should be mended, not ended. At other times in the debate, 'affirmative action' seems
to have a shifting meaning; it might be a simple minority recruitment program, or race and
gender goals in hiring. It might be minority set-aside provisions in state and federal con-
tracting, or the quotas that are often cited but rarely used.").
5. I first identified these models in an earlier work. See David B. Oppenheimer, Dis-
tinguishing Five Models of Affirmative Action, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 42 (1989).
6. Most of the Court's decisions in the area have involved affirmative action plans
directed toward blacks and Hispanics, and thus have focused on race-conscious decision-
making. Although women constitute a majority of the population, they are nonetheless
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permissible only as a remedy for discrimination. The standard by
which a court determines whether evidence of discrimination justifies
the use of race-conscious remedies varies. Those standards range
from evidence of a manifest imbalance in traditionally segregated job
categories used to justify a voluntary private affirmative action plan,7
to strong evidence of discrimination with a substantial continuing ef-
fect used to justify a publicly-imposed affirmative action plan," to a
preponderance of the evidence that discrimination has caused con-
crete harm, offered in an adversary proceeding, to justify a judicially-
imposed affirmative action plan.9 But in every case the underlying
justification for an employment or contracting affirmative action plan
is evidence of discrimination against women and minority group mem-
bers requiring remedial action. 10
Second, the Court has consistently required affirmative action
programs to be narrowly tailored to the purpose of remedying dis-
crimination. In practical terms, this means (1) a plan must be flexible,
employing goals rather than quotas, (2) it must be limited to fully
qualified applicants, (3) it must provide for some continuing opportu-
nities for whites and for men, (4) it must not require the reduction of
existing positions held by incumbent whites and men, and (5) it must
be temporary-designed to last no longer than necessary to remedy
the discrimination that justified the plan.1'
Part III reviews some of the recent data regarding the psychology
of discrimination in American society. This data suggests that we live
frequent targets of discrimination, are often underrepresented in the workplace, and, rela-
tive to men, lack economic power. They are thus treated as a "minority" group in many
affirmative action programs. One of the Supreme Court's decisions in this area was solely
concerned with affirmative action for women, and applied the same standards as those
used in race/ethnicity cases. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
Johnson involved statutory rights, not constitutional rights, and a conflict is developing
among the circuit courts of appeal over whether a constitutional challenge to affirmative
action for women should be analyzed differently because sex discrimination is not sub-
jected to the same constitutional scrutiny as are race and national origin discrimination.
Compare Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirmative ac-
tion plan for minority-owned contractors reviewed under strict scrutiny test and rejected;
affirmative action plan for women-owned contractors reviewed under intermediate scru-
tiny test and approved) with Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1989) (affirmative
action plan for women-owned businesses reviewed under strict scrutiny test).
7. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
8. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
9. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
10. In the area of school admissions the Court has deferred to the school's interest in
diversity as a justification for limited affirmative action programs. See discussion infra Part
II.
11. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
in a society in which race, ethnicity, and gender play a powerful role in
how people are judged. On a broad basis, white Americans view
black and Hispanic Americans as less intelligent, less hard working,
less honest, and more violent than whites. Similarly, men of all races
and ethnicities tend to view women as less able workers and leaders
than men. These views correspond with the hostility or ambivalence
of many whites and men toward the enforcement of civil rights laws.
The data also demonstrate that whites, on an individual level, are fre-
quently uncomfortable with or hostile toward blacks, Asian Ameri-
cans, and Hispanics, and are often unwilling to interact with them,
help them, or live in the same neighborhoods with them. These
prejudices, which are sometimes subconscious, help to explain why
discrimination remains a potent force in American life.
Part IV describes some of the many ways in which discrimination
operates in American life. This section illustrates why broad-based
remedies like affirmative action are still needed to counter the effects
of discrimination. It draws on the disciplines of sociology, social psy-
chology, political science, demography, business management, educa-
tion, psychology, and medicine. Within these fields, scholars have
found ample evidence that we continue to be a society in which great
privileges are afforded to white men not by virtue of their personal
merit, but because of the accident of their birth. This section reviews
the evidence that race, ethnicity and gender are potent indicators of
privilege in the areas of employment, education, housing, health care
and business opportunities, treatment by the criminal justice system,
and wealth or poverty. The evidence is persuasive that the cause of
these great disparities is racism and sexism, and that they can only be
corrected by broad remedies. The principal remedy available is af-
firmative action.
Although I conclude that the need for affirmative action is sub-
stantial, its support is uncertain, and the very concept is under attack.
Four arguments fuel the opposition to affirmative action: (1) affirma-
tive action requires racial quotas to be used in place of merit selection;
(2) affirmative action requires unqualified persons to be selected for
jobs, schools and commercial contracts; (3) because of affirmative ac-
tion, most employment and commercial discrimination in contempo-
rary society is experienced by white men, rather than minority group
members or women; and (4) affirmative action is intended to counter-
act the discrimination of the past, not the present, and thus requires
this generation of white men to pay for past discrimination that they
did not cause and from which they did not benefit. I hope to demon-
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strate in this article that each of these arguments is without merit. I
hope further to persuade the reader that affirmative action must con-
tinue to be part of our society-otherwise the dream of an equal soci-
ety will never be fulfilled.
I. The Practice of Affirmative Action
There are at least five methods of race- and gender-conscious
practices which are covered under the umbrella of affirmative action:
(1) quotas, (2) preferences, (3) self-studies, (4) outreach and counsel-
ing, and (5) anti-discrimination. Any rational discourse on the ques-
tion of affirmative action ought to begin with some attempt to identify
the type of affirmative action at issue.
A. Method I - Quotas
Quotas, the use of minimum or maximum participation levels in
the selection of women and minority group members, are the subject
of much of the debate, and much of the rancor, on the topic of affirm-
ative action. This is ironic, since the Supreme Court has consistently
held since the late 1970s that racial quotas by the government and by
businesses subject to government regulation are impermissible. 12
Although there were debates and litigation as far back as the 1940s
regarding the potential benefits and detriments of proportional hiring,
and some plans actually operating in the late 1960s and early 1970s to
guarantee that a predetermined number of minority group members
were selected for admission to certain schools, 13 any contemporary
discussion of quotas must be recognized as highly theoretical. We may
argue the merits of affirmative action quotas, but the Court has fore-
closed any further experiments with such plans. They are a dead
letter.
12. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (affirmative action
plan disapproved); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (affirmative action
plan approved subject to limitations).
13. For example, the U.C. Davis Medical School reserved sixteen of its one hundred
spots for disadvantaged students (although it didn't always use all of the spots reserved).
See discussion of Bakke, infra at Part II. Although not mentioned by the Court in its
decision in Bakke, the medical school had a second special admissions plan which was not
challenged. In what might be called an affirmative action plan for the well-connected-
five spaces in each class were reserved for the dean's personal selection. JoEL DREYFuss
& CHARLES LAWRENCE, III, THE BAKKE CASE: THm POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 41 (1979).
Such "privilege quotas" are the norm at major private universities. See John D. Lamb, The
Real Affirmative Action Babies: Legacy Preferences at Harvard and Yale, 26 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBS. 491 (1993).
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B. Method II - Preferences
Preferences are properly at the center of the current debate. To
proponents of affirmative action, they are a necessary remedy for con-
tinuing discrimination. To opponents, they are everything that is
wrong with affirmative action. Governor Pete Wilson of California
sees them as immoral.'4 Supreme Court Justices Scalia and Thomas
see them as stigmatizing for African Americans.' 5 Justice O'Connor
worries that they are used as a cover under which de facto quotas are
applied.'6
Affirmative action preferences may take many forms. In school
admissions, race may be used as a factor in assessing an applicant, in
the same way that a school may consider geography, athletic achieve-
ments, or other factors that help ensure a diverse student body.' 7
Even where there is no history of discrimination, a school's decision to
seek diversity among its students is considered to be within the sphere
of its academic freedom; in the absence of quotas, the government will
not interfere with a school's use of race as a factor in admissions
decisions. 8
In employment, the categories of race, ethnicity and gender may
be considered as factors in selecting employees for hire or promotion,
but only under limited circumstances explained more fully in Part II.
When these categories are considered under bona-fide affirmative ac-
tion employment plans, they may be used as preferences in a number
of circumstances. First, in choosing among candidates who are evalu-
ated as fully qualified, race or gender may be used as the decisive
factor. Second, when a list of candidates is being assembled from
which a selection is to be made, it may be expanded if it is found to
have few or no female or minority candidates, provided that the ad-
ded candidates are fully qualified for the position. Third, when the
selection of a candidate is being considered, race, ethnicity or gender
may be used as one factor among many in evaluating competing quali-
fied candidates. Fourth, when selections are made under the supervi-
14. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Affirmative Action's End? Now It's Not That Simple,
N.Y. TniFs, July 24, 1995, at Al.
15. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2118 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring).
16. This concern was sufficiently strong to provoke Justice O'Connor to question the
wisdom of liability for discrimination based on a "disparate impact" analysis. See Watson
v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 993 (1988).
17. This is the formulation of Justice Powell's decision in Bakke. See discussion infra
Part II.
18. See discussion infra Part II.
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sion of a court, segregated lists may be established and used
alternately, assuming there are a sufficient number of qualified candi-
dates to satisfy the selection criteria.19
In contracting, -as in employment, race or gender-based prefer-
ences are strictly constrained by law. The government may only con-
sider gender, ethnicity or race in awarding contracts when there is
strong evidence that illegal discrimination sufficient to require a pres-
ent legal remedy has occurred.20 When justified, these categories may
be used as preferences in a number of ways, which are sometimes
lumped together under the term "set-asides." This term is misleading.
Except in a few federal programs now under review, the government
may not set aside a portion of a contract to be performed exclusively
by women and minorities. It may only set a goal for minority partici-
pation and attempt, through various procedures, to meet that goal.
There are four basic Method II preference strategies used by the
government to meet affirmative action goals. First, a bid may be re-
duced by a certain percentage to improve a minority or female con-
tractor or vendor's competitive position. This may increase the
likelihood that the female-owned or minority-owned business will be
awarded the contract. For example, a $1,000,000 bid to lay sewer pipe
by a qualified minority-owned business, or a business determined to
be socially and economically disadvantaged, may be given a 2% mi-
nority preference, thus reducing the bid amount to $980,000. If a
white-owned contractor bid $981,000 the minority-owned business
could nevertheless be awarded the contract, and paid $1,000,000 to
perform.
Second, points may be added to the minority or female-owned
business' bid to achieve the same purpose. Using the previous exam-
ple, the minority-owned contractor could bid $980,000, thus underbid-
ding the white contractor's bid of $981,000, but be paid $1,000,000 to
perform the work.
Third, white male-owned businesses submitting bids may be given
a competitive advantage if their bid includes an agreement to use mi-
19. One obvious form of preference, which to the author's knowledge is not used in
race-conscious employment selections, is to add points to the scores of the favored group.
For example, many states add points in grading civil service exams taken by veterans of the
United States armed forces. Unlike racial or gender preferences, a veterans' preference
may be absolute, as is the case in Massachusetts. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256 (1979) (veterans' preference upheld against sex discrimination challenge).
20. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (affirmative action
plan disapproved); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (affirmative
action plan remanded). See also discussion infra Part II.
nority or female-owned businesses as subcontractors for a certain
amount of the work to be performed. To continue with the previous
example, a white male contractor submitting a $1,000,000 bid who
agreed to subcontract at least $100,000 of his work to female or minor-
ity-owned firms would be given a 2% bidding preference, reducing the
bid to $980,000 for competitive purposes. Alternatively, the white
male contractor might be given a bonus for using women or minority-
owned subcontractors. In this example, he might be paid $1,020,000
on a $1,000,000 bid.
Fourth, white-owned businesses submitting bids may simply be
required to promise to use female or minority-owned businesses for a
minimum amount of the job, or to obtain a waiver establishing that no
qualified minority or female-owned subcontractor was available or
willing to bid competitively on the job. In the above example, the
white male contractor with the $1,000,000 bid may be required to sub-
contract $100,000 of the work to women or minority-owned subcon-
tractors, or establish that after a good faith effort it found insufficient
women or minority-owned firms to meet the requirement, as a condi-
tion of bidding on the job.
Under any of these systems, the preference may only be used to
raise minority or female participation to the level it would be expected
to reach in the absence of discrimination.
C. Method I - Self-Studies
Affirmative action plans that require self-studies, such as how a
business' employment selection decisions are made, are far more com-
mon than are preference plans. As a result of Executive Order 11246,
first adopted by President Lyndon Johnson, any entity, public or pri-
vate, doing substantial business with the federal government, is re-
quired to engage in a self-study." Approximately'$90,000 American
businesses are regulated under this provision.22 As a result of the
Croson and Adarand decisions, such studies are required before the
government can authorize any Method II affirmative action prefer-
ence plans.23
21. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11 (1995).
22. A bill introduced by Senator Robert Dole in 1995 would eliminate this form of
affirmative action. See Louis Freedberg, Dole Ready to Kill Affirmative Action, S.F.
CHRON., July 27, 1995, at Al, All.
23. These decisions have spawned a cottage industry of affirmative action consulting
firms who specialize in conducting the studies necessary to justify a plan. Michael Geb-
hardt, Documenting Discrimination, RECORDER, July 14, 1995, at 1.
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In the case of employment or contracting, self-studies focus on a
comparison between a business' actual hiring or contracting selection
and the available pool of qualified employees or businesses within the
geographical region from which the selections were made. For exam-
ple, a plumbing contractor may compare the race and gender of the
plumbers it hires with the race and gender percentages of plumbers
seeking work in the geographical area from which it does its hiring. It
might also compare the number of minority or women-owned busi-
nesses with which it subcontracts, compared with the pool of subcon-
tractors with which it works. Further inquiry is required when a
significant disparity is found between the available selection pool and
the actual selections. In the face of a significant disparity, practices
that are identified as discriminatory must be eliminated, goals for mi-
nority hiring or contracting may be set, and timetables to study pro-
gress may be established.
As discussed more fully in Part II, goals and timetables adopted
pursuant to a Method III self-study must meet most of the standards
imposed on Method II preference plans in order to withstand legal
scrutiny: they must be flexible and waivable, limited in time, adopted
for the purpose of eliminating a manifest imbalance or substantial dis-
parity, and no broader in scope than the discrimination that caused
the disparity.2 4
Other less rigorous forms of self-study also occur regularly. For
example, all large employers are required by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to keep track of the race, ethnicity,
gender, and age of their employees and applicants for employment,
and to categorize them by income and employment position.25 The
data need not be reported to the government unless it is deemed nec-
essary to evaluate a discrimination complaint. However, the very act
of data collection may help employers recognize patterns suggestive of
discrimination, and thus serve as an impetus to act.
Similarly, public entities other than the federal government may
require their contractors to keep track of their hiring patterns to serve
as a reminder of their obligation not to discriminate. For example, in
response to the Croson decision, the city of Berkeley, California,
dropped its mandatory Method II affirmative action plan for city ven-
dors and contractors, and instituted a "voluntary compliance" plan
24. See, e.g., Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501
(1986).
25. See 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (1995).
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that requires contractors not to discriminate and to provide the city
with workforce composition data.26
In the absence of government mandates, entities may nonetheless
choose to engage in self-studies for affirmative action purposes. For
example, businesses may study their employment processes either for
reasons of corporate responsibility or to protect against discrimination
lawsuits. They might also elect to examine their employment or mar-
keting practices to determine whether they could increase profits by
directing their sales efforts at a more diverse population. 7
Colleges and universities may engage in affirmative action self-
studies to investigate their admissions or job placement processes.
Such studies are not subject to legal limitations. However, if the stud-
ies disclose ongoing discrimination that would justify a remedy, it is
permissible only if it meets the standards referred to above and dis-
cussed in greater detail below in Part II.
D. Method IV - Outreach and Counseling
Outreach and counseling programs are another common form of
affirmative action. The purpose of an outreach plan is to diversify the
pool from which selections are made by reaching out to minorities.
They are the most frequent remedy adopted in response to evidence
of disparity found in Method III affirmative action self-studies. For
example, an employer may find that it is hiring largely by word of
mouth, and thus limiting its searches to those persons friendly with or
related to its current employees. Given typical patterns of residential,
social and familial segregation, if its workforce is largely white, it will
be perpetuated as largely white. Or a college may recruit largely from
certain "feeder" high schools. If the feeder schools are largely white,
the college will be as well.
Counseling programs are a similar form of Method IV affirmative
action programs. An employer may find that women or minority em-
ployees recruited under a Method IV plan need help adjusting to its
"corporate culture." Or a school may find that women or minority
students feel isolated or alienated by the school environment, or
otherwise need assistance to excel. Method IV affirmative action
counseling programs respond to this need.
Examples of Method IV outreach and counseling programs in-
clude: programs run by colleges and universities to inform students at
26. Gebhardt, supra note 23, at 10.
27. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, Some Action, Little Talk-Companies Embrace Diver-
sity, but Are Reluctant to Discuss It, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 20, 1995, at C1.
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minority high schools of the schools' admissions requirements; pro-
grams run by colleges and universities to enrich the academic pro-
grams at minority high schools; programs run by colleges and
universities to encourage minority students to attend college; pro-
grams run by colleges and universities to encourage middle school and
high school girls to consider careers in math and science; programs to
provide scholarships to minority students; programs to inform woman-
owned and minority-owned businesses of the criteria for applying for
government contracts; programs to inform women-owned and minor-
ity-owned businesses of opportunities to bid on contracts; programs to
inform women and/or minority group members of employment, career
or promotional opportunities; and programs to assist women and/or
minority group members in establishing their own businesses.
Until recently, outreach and counseling programs were not con-
troversial. In California, however, the proposed constitutional
amendment eliminating affirmative action has been read as eliminat-
ing outreach and counseling plans where they target participants
based on race, sex or ethnicity.2
E. Method V - Anti-Discrimination
The anti-discrimination method of affirmative action is, simply,
the affirmative commitment by employers, schools or contracting enti-
ties to prevent or avoid discrimination. This is the most common and
least controversial form of affirmative action. Some would argue that
it is not properly termed affirmative action at all. Anti-discrimination
affirmative action plans may include: (1) anti-discrimination or non-
discrimination policies distributed to employees; (2) complaint resolu-
tion procedures aimed at preventing or rapidly remedying discrimina-
tion; and (3) diversity training, sensitivity training and sexual
harassment training for employees and management to promote
cross-racial and cross-gender understanding in the workplace.
A well-designed affirmative action plan will incorporate more
than a single method. For example, a Method III self-study, whether
voluntary or compelled by federal regulation, may lead to the adop-
tion of Method II goals and timetables incorporating hiring prefer-
ences, the adoption of Method IV outreach and counseling efforts, the
implementation of a Method V anti-discrimination program or diver-
sity training program, and a commitment to additional Method III
28. See letter from Elizabeth Hill, California Legislative Analyst, and Russel S. Gould,
California Director of Finance, to Daniel E. Lungren, California Attorney General (Sept.
12, 1995) (on file with author).
self-studies. As one illustration, consider San Diego's affirmative ac-
tion plan in the 1970s and early 1980s, which incorporated Methods II,
III, IV, and V.2 9 The plan included hiring goals, recruitment of wo-
men and minority candidates, review of testing procedures which ac-
ted as an artificial barrier to qualified applicants, and anti-harassment
policies and training.30 In selling the plan to the San Diego City
Council, its proponent, then Mayor Pete Wilson, explained that "[i]t
must come from the heart, but we must have goals to do it."'31
H. The Law of Affirmative Action
Although the Supreme Court has generated multiple conflicting
views of the legality of various affirmative action plans, a unifying
theme runs through all of its decisions-affirmative action that in-
cludes race-conscious decision making is legitimate if, and only if, it is
used as a remedy for discrimination. Absent evidence of discrimina-
tion for which a present remedy is appropriate, race-conscious deci-
sion making is always impermissible. The degree of evidence required
will depend on the circumstances, varying from a relatively moderate
standard (evidence of a manifest imbalance in traditionally segregated
job categories) in the case of voluntary affirmative action undertaken
by a private entity,3 2 to an extremely strict standard (a strong basis in
evidence that illegal discrimination sufficient to require a remedy has
occurred) in the case of affirmative action by a public entity.33 But in
29. See Carla Seaquist, Pete Wilson's Gorgeous Mosaic, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1995, at
A15.
30. As described by one of the city's affirmative action officers:
We never set and required quotas. Why? Because unqualified hires who made
mistakes would have destroyed the program that we were building.... The mu-
nicipal work force began to mirror San Diego's population. Women and mem-
bers of minority groups became police officers, firefighters, truck drivers,
electricians, water-treatment operators, park-maintenance workers and life-
guards. The city achieved balance by rooting out considerations unrelated to job
performance. Among other changes, the city dropped the requirement in the
firefighter test that applicants handle the ladder alone-which tended to elimi-
nate women-when in actual firefighting it is not usually a one-person task....
We recruited assiduously in the African American, Hispanic and Asian-American
communities and among women.... A prototype sexual-harassment policy, one
of the nation's first, was introduced.
Ild.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (affirmative action
plan approved).
33. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (affirmative
action plan disapproved); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (af-
firmative action plan remanded). A strict standard is required when the actor is a public
entity because the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the government from en-
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every case where the Court has approved a plan including race-con-
scious decisionmaking, the Court was satisfied there was evidence of
discrimination which justified a remedy.3 4
The Court has reiterated these principles in cases involving four
distinguishable situations: (1) court-imposed affirmative action reme-
dies following the entry of judgment in discrimination cases;35 (2)
court-approved settlements, or consent decrees, resolving the litiga-
tion of discrimination cases through the adoption of affirmative action
plans;3 6 (3) affirmative action plans adopted voluntarily by private en-
tities;37 and (4) affirmative action plans adopted by public entities.3 8
In each of these situations, the Court has approved the use of race-
conscious decisionmaking when there has been sufficient evidence of
discrimination, subject to certain limitations intended to ensure that
the remedy imposed was sufficiently narrowly drawn.
In the case of judicially-imposed remedies, a court may only or-
der an affirmative action remedy that includes race-conscious deci-
sionmaking when the defendant has been found to have illegally
discriminated against the class of persons who will benefit from the
remedy. 39 In the case of judicially-approved remedies, a court may
approve a settlement in a race discrimination case that includes an
affirmative action remedy utilizing race-conscious decisionmaking
when there is a strong basis in evidence to believe that the defendant
has engaged in illegal discrimination.40 In the case of private entities
voluntarily adopting affirmative action plans that include race or gen-
der-conscious decisionmaking, the Court will affirm such plans where
there is significant evidence that the purpose of the plan is remedial,
and that the entity's prior decisionmaking was tainted by illegal dis-
gaging in classifications based on race, including classifications which benefit minorities,
unless the classification is justified by a compelling state interest (such as remedying dis-
crimination) and is narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal. Adarand, 115 S. Ct.
at 2100.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (affirmative action plan
approved).
35. See, e.g., id.
36. See, e.g., Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501
(1986) (affirmative action plan approved).
37. See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (affirmative action plan approved).
38. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (affirmative
action plan disapproved); Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (affirmative action plan disapproved);
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (affirmative action plan remanded).
39. See, e.g., Paradise, 480 U.S. 149.
40. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986).
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crimination. 41 In the case of public entities adopting affirmative ac-
tion plans which include race-conscious decisionmaking, such plans
are permissible only where there is strong evidence that the purpose
of the plan is remedial, the government's prior decisionmaking was
the result of illegal discrimination, and the plan is narrowly focused to
remedy only the discrimination at which it is directed.42
Although the Court has approved affirmative action plans in each
of these situations, it has insisted on a high barrier of protection
against abuse. This signals its concern that the protection of minor-
ity43 rights not result in the diminution of legitimate majority expecta-
tions. Thus, affirmative action plans which impose race or gender-
conscious decision-making have only been approved when three fur-
ther criteria are met." First, the plan must be flexible, eschewing
strict quotas in favor of fluid and amendable goals and timetables di-
rected at increasing minority participation, rather than mere by-the-
numbers decisionmaking.45 Second, the plan must be temporary, con-
tinuing only as long as necessary to correct the problem it addresses.
Third, the plan must not interfere with the legitimate settled expecta-
tions of incumbent majority members, such as existing white male
employees.
These principles were hinted at in 1978 in Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke,46 and were first fully articulated by the
Court in 1979 in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber.47 Although
the application of these principles has often been controversial, lead-
ing to fractured pluralities and bitter division among the members of
the Court, and although that the extent of proof of discrimination re-
quired has been revised, their underlying force remains undiminished.
41. See, eg., Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09; Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S.
616 (1987) (extending Weber to sex discrimination cases brought under Title VII, but re-
serving the question of whether sex discrimination is to be treated identically to race dis-
crimination in the case of a constitutional challenge). Johnson is the only sex
discrimination affirmative action challenge which has been heard by the Supreme Court.
42. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (stating standard for state or local governmental
affirmative action plans); Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (stating standard for federal affirmative
action plans).
43. While women constitute a majority of the population, I include them as a "minor-
ity" group because of their relative lack of economic power.
44. See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. 267.
45. Underlying this criteria is a fundamental principle of affirmative action-that it be
a vehicle for the discovery and selection of qualified candidates, not an excuse for the
selection of the unqualified.
46. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
47. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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Plans that meet these criteria gain the Court's approval; those that do
not are deemed illegitimate.
Bakke concerned a challenge to a special admissions program
adopted by the medical school at U.C. Davis. After finding that it was
admitting no Mexican-American or black students, the school decided
to reserve up to 16 of its 100 spots for applicants who had been eco-
nomically disadvantaged.48 Alan Bakke, a white applicant who had
been rejected, challenged this plan, claiming that, given his grades and
test scores, he would have been admitted if he had been a member of
a minority group.a9 Therefore, he argued, the plan violated his right
to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.50
In the Court's lead opinion,51 Justice Powell characterized the
U.C. Davis plan as imposing a rigid racial quota that completely elimi-
nated Bakke from consideration for the sixteen special admission
spots. 52 The Powell opinion explained that the University could im-
pose such a remedy only if it established that it had discriminated
against minority students,53 or if it could prove that it was using race
as a counter-weight to racial or cultural bias in the admissions ap-
praisal process.54 Practically then, the Court affirmed Bakke's claim
that the University's plan was impermissible.55
However, the opinion went on to suggest that the University
could consider race as a factor, along with other factors such as geo-
graphic region, size of community of origin, community activities, ath-
letic participation, and other factors traditionally used by schools to
select a diverse student body as long as race was merely one factor
48. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272-75.
49. Id at 266.
50. ld. at 277-78.
51. There were six separate opinions in the case: Justice Powell was joined in minor
part by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, the four of whom also submitted
a joint opinion concurring in the judgment; Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun each
also submitted separate opinions; Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Stewart and Rehnquist, submitted an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part. Id. at 268. This balkanization of the Court's voice is common in its affirmative action
decisions, and it seems to be in conflict with my argument that there is a core of shared
principles that runs through the decisions. Examination of the opinions reveals, however,
that the Court's failure to reach a consensus in this case arises from disagreements as to the
level of scrutiny appropriate in judging government-sponsored affirmative action plans,
and the resulting differences in when they are deemed subject to review, rather than from
the restrictions described in the text. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166
(1987).
52. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288-89 & n.26.
53. Id at 300-01, 307-10.
54. Id. at 306 n.43.
55. Id. at 315.
among many intended to admit a well-rounded class.56 Powell rea-
soned that governmental interference with the university's judgment,
when diversity was merely a factor in its decisionmaking process,
would interfere with its academic freedom in violation of the First
Amendment.5 7 The opinion quoted from Harvard College's descrip-
tion of the role of diversity in its admissions process: "A farm boy
from Idaho can bring something to Harvard College that a Bostonian
cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can usually bring something
that a white person cannot offer."'58 Under such circumstances the use
of race as a selection criterion would not violate the Constitution.
Bakke is the only affirmative action case decided by the Court
involving school admissions. 59 All of the other Supreme Court cases
concern affirmative action in employment or government contracting.
The social interest and academic freedom issues in promoting diver-
sity may be stronger and more apparent in education than in employ-
ment or contracting, and it may therefore be risky to draw conclusions
about these other areas from the Court's statements in Bakke. While
the Court was concerned about the effect of affirmative action on the
expectations and opportunities of whites, it is clear nonetheless that
the Court regarded affirmative action as a potentially legitimate rem-
edy to be approved where necessary to counteract discrimination.
Thus the Court rejected the U.C. Davis plan but made it clear that
some affirmative action plans that included race-conscious decision-
making would be permissible.
The Court reached the issue of affirmative action in employment
the following term in Weber.60 Weber concerned a challenge to a vol-
untary affirmative action plan adopted by Kaiser Aluminum & Chem-
ical Corporation (Kaiser) as a result of its contract negotiations with
the United Steelworkers union.6' The plan applied to fifteen Kaiser
plants and was designed to eliminate the racial imbalance in Kaiser's
employment of skilled craftworkers, almost all of whom were white.62
The parties agreed that instead of Kaiser continuing its practice of
hiring trained craftworkers, it would develop an apprenticeship pro-
56. Id. at 311-19.
57. Id at 314.
58. Id at 316.
59. The court granted certiorari to a case involving law school admissions, but dis-
missed it after oral argument because of mootness. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974).
60. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
61. Id at 199.
62. Id at 197-98.
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gram with the union to train its incumbent employees in the skilled
crafts.63 Fifty percent of those admitted to the program would be
black until the percentage of black skilled craftworkers was equal to
the percentage of blacks in each plant's local labor force. 6
One of the fifteen Kaiser plants was in Gramercy, Louisiana. Be-
cause blacks had been systematically excluded from the skilled craft
unions, only 5 of the 273 skilled craftworkers at the Gramercy plant
were black prior to the adoption of the plan, despite a workforce that
was 39% black.65 In the first year of the plan's operation, seven black
employees and six white employees were admitted into the appren-
ticeship program.66 A number of white employees who sought entry,
including Brian Weber, had greater seniority than some of the black
employees who were admitted.67 Weber thus challenged the plan as
discriminating against him on the basis of race in violation of Title
VII.68
The Supreme Court rejected the challenge and approved the af-
firmative action plan.69 The Court cautioned that its approval was
based on the following facts concerning the plan: it was clearly in-
tended to be remedial, being "designed to eliminate conspicuous ra-
cial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories"; its
underlying intent was the same as that of Title VII, to eliminate racial
discrimination against blacks; its purpose was not to impose a racial
balance but instead to eliminate a "manifest racial imbalance"; it did
not absolutely deprive whites of employment opportunities, since only
half of the positions were reserved for blacks; it did not deprive Weber
of a position to which he was otherwise entitled because the program
created new opportunities for whites, as well as blacks, which previ-
ously had not existed; and it was designed to continue only until the
percentage of black skilled craftworkers in the plant mirrored the
population of the available work force.7 °
63. Id. at 198.
64. 1& at 197.
65. Id. at 198-99.
66. Id. at 198.
67. Id. at 199.
68. Id. at 199-200.
69. Justice Brennan authored the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Stewart,
White, Marshall and Blackmun; Justice Blackmun also authored a concurring opinion;
Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion and joined in a second dissenting opinion by
Justice Rehnquist; Justices Powell and Stevens did not participate. Id. at 196.
70. I& at 208-09. The Court noted that "[i]t would be ironic indeed if a law triggered
by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of
those who had 'been excluded from the American dream for so long' constituted the first
Although the Court's support of affirmative action-plans incorpo-
rating race-conscious decisionmaking has ebbed in the seventeen
years since Weber, the basic analysis of Weber has not significantly
changed.7 In cases involving race-conscious decisionmaking by pub-
lic entities, the Court has required far greater proof of discrimination
than a mere "manifest imbalance," insisting upon strong proof of dis-
crimination in the cause as well as in the result.72 The Court has thus
rejected affirmative action plans where the evidence of discrimination
has been insufficient, 73 where the settled expectations of white incum-
bents have been disturbed,74 or where the plan has been too broad or
open-ended.75
Where the essential criteria described in Weber have been met,
however, the plans have been approved. For example, in Local 28,
Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n v. EEOC,7 6 the Court ap-
proved a court-imposed affirmative action plan in which the goal of
29.23% non-white union membership was set by a court-appointed
administrator.77 The union had violated Title VII by excluding blacks
and Hispanics from membership,78 and was later found in contempt of
court, both for failing to obey the court's earlier remedial orders to
recruit minority members and for providing special job protection to
white members.79 The union appealed the affirmative action order,
claiming it exceeded the scope of remedies available under Title VIIY0
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Ste-
vens, concluded that imposition of membership goals as an affirmative
legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy." Id at 204 (citation omitted).
71. The Court has, however, dropped its approval of the use of quotas in affirmative
action plans. In applying the Weber rationale to an affirmative action plan that substituted
goals for quotas, the Court held that if the plan had used quotas rather than goals it would
have been impermissible under Title VII. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S.
616, 628 (1987).
72. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). By contrast, although the Court's decision in
Weber described strong evidence of discrimination leading to the adoption of the affirma-
tive action plan, the Court did not reach the defense offered by Kaiser and the Steelwork-
ers that their fear of liability for violations of Title VII justified their imposition of an
affirmative action remedy. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 n.8, 209 n.9.
73. See, eg., Croson, 488 U.S. at 469.
74. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
75. See eg., Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
76. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
77. Id at 440.
78. Id at 429-30.
79. Id at 434-35.
80. Id at 440.
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action remedy was permissible because it was intended to remedy a
clear showing of discrimination and would have only a marginal im-
pact on the interests of the white union members.8' Justice Powell
provided a fifth vote in a concurring opinion, in which he offered five
reasons to conclude that the affirmative action order was permissible.
First, there was a particularly egregious violation of Title VII, and in-
junctive relief alone would be inadequate;82 second, there was no ap-
parent less restrictive remedy, and if the district court could not
impose a goal, it would have been rendered powerless;83 third, the
duration of the remedy was properly related to achieving its goal;84
fourth, unlike a quota, the goal was flexible, with waivers permitted;8 5
and fifth, the white union members would not be burdened by the
order.86
Similarly, in United States v. Paradise8' the Court approved a
court-imposed affirmative action plan governing promotions of Ala-
bama State troopers from the rank of private to corporal.88 The plan
required the promotion of a black private for each promotion of a
white private (subject to the availability of qualified black privates)
until the percentage of black corporals matched the available black
labor force (25%) or until a non-discriminatory promotion plan was
developed.89 Although this plan came perilously close to the kind of
rigid quota the Court has usually condemned, in this setting the plan
was permissible because of Alabama's long history of discrimination,
combined with its failure to comply with earlier, less-exacting consent
decrees and court-imposed remedies.90 The plan was flexible, in that
it operated as a goal, not a quota;91 it was "waivable and temporary in
81. 1d. at 479-80.
82. Id at 483-84 (Powell, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 486-87.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 487-88.
86. Id at 488.
87. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
88. Id. at 185.
89. Id. at 154-55, 163-64.
90. Id at 154. The Court explained that in 1972 the district court first ordered the hire
and promotion of black troopers, finding that they had been systematically excluded from
employment-in the entire history of the patrol there had never been a black trooper. Id.
at 153-54. Despite the district court order, the state simply refused to hire blacks as troop-
ers. Id at 153. The plaintiffs were forced to return for further orders to carry out the
initial injunction in 1974, 1977, 1981 and 1983. Id. at 154-59. By 1984, although some black
officers had been hired, only 4 of the 197 officers above the rank of private were black. Id.
at 162-63.
91. Id at 177. The 50% rule could be waived if there were insufficient numbers of
qualified black applicants for promotion. Id
application";92 and the delay in promotions for white troopers did not
constitute an unacceptable burden on innocent parties in the manner
that a layoff might because the plan called merely for a
postponement. 93
Similarly, in Local 93, International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland,94 the Court approved a consent decree providing an affirm-
ative action promotion plan that required that 33 of 66 imminent pro-
motions to Lieutenant and 10 of 52 promotions to positions above
Lieutenant be awarded to black and Hispanic firefighters who had
passed the promotional exams, and set goals for further promotions
over a 4 year period.95 The district court based its approval of the
plan on the considerable evidence of minority exclusion from promo-
tions, the city's admission of discrimination, the plan's fairness to
white firefighters, the reasonableness of the goals set, and the short
duration of the plan.96 Over the objections of the union, which was
dominated by white firefighters, the Supreme Court treated the con-
sent decree as a voluntary affirmative action plan and affirmed the
district court's authority to approve such a plan.97
The Court has not been reluctant to reject affirmative action
plans requiring race-conscious decisionmaking where it deemed the
evidence of discrimination insufficient, or the plan unfair to whites or
unartfully drawn. For example, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion,98 the Court rejected a policy that required school teacher layoffs
to be governed by a combination of seniority and race.99 The purpose
of the policy was to maintain the then-existing percentage of minority
teachers. 10 The district court approved the policy not because of past
discrimination by the Board, but because it accepted the Board's argu-
ments that minority teachers were needed as role models for minority
students, and allowed the Board to consider race in layoffs in order to
alleviate the effects of societal discrimination. 101 The Supreme Court
rejected these justifications in a plurality opinion by Justice Powell.' 2
92. IM at 177-78.
93. Id at 182-83.
94. 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
95. Id at 507-10.
96. Id at 512-13.
97. Id at 525.
98. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
99. Id at 283-84.
100. Id at 270.
101. Id at 272-73.
102. Justice Powell's decision was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
and in part by Justice O'Connor, Justice O'Connor also filed an opinion concurring in part
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He concluded that the role model theory conflicted with integrationist
principles and permitted race-conscious decisionmaking "long past the
point required by any legitimate remedial purpose."' 3 "Societal dis-
crimination, without more," he determined, "is too amorphous a basis
for imposing a racially classified remedy."'1 4 Regarding the Board's
attempt on appeal to admit having discriminated in its hiring and thus
justify the plan as a remedy for its discrimination, Powell explained
that the "trial court must make a factual determination that the em-
ployer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial
action was necessary."'0 5 A unilateral admission of discrimination,
absent strong evidence, is insufficient.106 Moreover, the use of race in
determining layoffs as opposed to hiring decisions was regarded as
highly suspect. Justice Powell reasoned that although hiring prefer-
ences have a diffuse impact on white applicants, who can be expected
to submit applications to multiple employers and to have little basis
for settled expectations, layoff preferences in derogation of seniority
deprive white workers of an object of considerable value into which
they have made a substantial investment. 10 7
Similarly, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,' 08 Justice
O'Connor, writing for a once again fractured Court,10 9 rejected an af-
firmative action plan that the Court viewed as having gone beyond
providing a remedy for past or continuing discrimination."10 The plan
required non-minority construction companies entering into contracts
with the city to pledge to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar
amount of their contracts to minority owned businesses."' The City
Council justified the plan based on the disclosure that although more
than half of the city's residents were black, well over 99% of the city's
and concurring in the judgment; Justice White authored an opinion concurring in the judg-
ment; Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, as did Justice Marshall, who was joined by
Justices Brennan and Blackmun. Id. at 268.
103. 1I at 275.
104. Id at 276.
105. Id at 277.
106. Id- at 278.
107. Id. at 280-83.
108. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
109. There were six opinions by the nine justices, with between three and five votes for
various portions of the lead decision. Parts of Justice O'Connor's opinion were joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices White, Stevens and Kennedy; Justices Stevens and
Kennedy each authored opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment; Jus-
tice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment; Justice Marshall filed a dissenting
opinion which was joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun; Justice Blackmun filed a
dissenting opinion which was joined by Justice Brennan. Id. at 475.
110. Id. at 505.
111. Id at 477.
UNDERSTANDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
construction contracts were with white-owned businesses, and that the
construction contractors' associations in the region had virtually no
minority businesses among their members." 2
The Court found that the city had failed to establish the need for
remedial action because it had not investigated why it had entered
into so few contracts with minority-owned businesses. 113 If the city
had made factual findings based on a strong basis in evidence that it
had discriminated in its prior practices, or that it had "become a 'pas-
sive participant' in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements
of the local construction industry," it could "take affirmative steps to
dismantle such a system. 1" 4 However, the inferences drawn from the
low level of minority business participation and the high black popula-
tion were deemed insufficient evidence; the 30% set-aside was not
tied to the level of discrimination being remedied or to the population
of available minority contractors; it was extended to groups such as
American Indians against whom there was no evidence of discrimina-
tion in Richmond; and it operated as a quota, not a flexible goal." 5
As a result of Croson, state and local governments that have
adopted race-conscious selection plans for employment or contracting
have been required to engage in self-studies to determine whether
there is strong evidence that their selection of employees, contractors,
or vendors has been discriminatory, and, if so, whether their affirma-
tive action plan is narrowly drawn to remedy that discrimination.
Where such studies have been properly performed, race-conscious se-
lection plans have been approved by the courts.
In San Francisco, for example, the city government commissioned
two statistical studies, held a series of evidentiary hearings, and in-
vited written submissions from the public.116 The Board of Supervi-
sors used this data to make detailed findings regarding discrimination
in some, but not all, areas of city contracting with minority-owned and
women-owned businesses.1 7 In those areas where discrimination was
found, an affirmative action plan was crafted which provided a 5%
bidding preference on certain kinds of city contracts to relatively small
women-owned and minority-owned businesses, and to joint ventures
that included a substantial amount of participation by relatively small
112. Id. at 479-80.
113. L at 500.
114. Id at 492.
115. Id at 498-506.
116. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Coalition for Economic Equality, 950 F.2d
1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1991).
117. Id at 1414-15.
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women-owned and minority-owned businesses." 8 The U.S. district
court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to
the plan by large contracting firms owned by white males." 9
In 1995, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,'20 the Supreme
Court extended its ruling in Croson to affirmative action plans man-
dated by Congress.' 2' Prior to Adarand, the Court had viewed con-
gressionally-mandated affirmative actions plans as resting on a
different footing than state-mandated plans, because Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress with special powers to
carry out the purposes of the amendment. 1' In Adarand, the Court
made uniform the rules for all government-sponsored affirmative ac-
tion plans, both state and federal. 23
Adarand concerned the federal set-aside provisions required in
most federal agency contracts. 24 These provisions promote a goal of
5% participation by disadvantaged business in federal contracts by
providing contractors with financial incentives to subcontract with
businesses determined by the Small Business Administration (SBA)
to be socially and economically disadvantaged. 25 Small businesses
owned by minority group members are presumed to be socially and
economically disadvantaged under SBA regulations, although this
presumption is rebuttable. 26 The lower courts reviewed the plan
under an intermediate scrutiny standard, and found it to be justi-
fied. 127 The Supreme Court, in a lead opinion by Justice O'Connor, 28
required the plan to be reviewed under the strict scrutiny test applied
in Croson.'29 As a result, federal affirmative action plans utilizing
race-conscious decisionmaking will now require the kind of searching
118. Id at 1404-05.
119. Id.
120. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
121. Id. at 2111.
122. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547 (1990).
123. 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
124. Id. at 2101-02.
125. Id at 2102-03.
126. Id at 2103.
127. Id at 2118.
128. Once again there were multiple opinions. Justice O'Connor announced the deci-
sion of the Court and authored an opinion joined by Justice Kennedy and joined in part by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas; Justices Scalia and Thomas each
authored decisions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment; Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer each dissented, in separate opinions. Id at 2101.
129. 1d at 2100.
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self-examination by the federal government that Croson requires of
state and local governments.130
The Court in Adarand was bitterly divided, not simply on the
legal question before it, but on the core issue of whether racial prefer-
ences were socially desirable. The majority held that in examining
race-conscious decisionmaking by the government, decisions favoring
minorities should be viewed no differently than those harming minori-
ties.13' Justice O'Connor concluded that although the plan "stigma-
tizes the disadvantaged class [here white men] with the unproven
charge of past racial discrimination, it actually imposes a greater
stigma on its supposed beneficiaries.' 132 Justice Scalia, in a concurring
opinion, argued that the government can never permit race-conscious
decisionmaking: "In the eyes of the government, we are just one race
here. It is American.' 1 33 In dissent, Justice Stevens accused the ma-
jority of failing to recognize the "difference between a decision by the
majority to impose a special burden on the members of a minority
race and a decision by the majority to provide a benefit to certain
members of that minority notwithstanding its incidental burden on
some members of the majority.' 1 34 Or, as he summed up the major-
ity's view, it failed to distinguish between a "'No Trespassing' sign and
a welcome mat.' '1 35
Despite the colorful rhetoric, both Justice O'Connor and Justice
Ginsburg each pointed out that the decision permits governmental af-
firmative action plans to embrace race-conscious preferences as long
as they meet the exacting standards of the strict scrutiny test for equal
protection analysis.' 3 6 This test provides that when a government reg-
130. Within days of the announcement of the decision, the Department of Justice dis-
tributed a memorandum to federal agencies explaining the steps required to justify their
affirmative action plans. See memorandum to General Counsels from Walter Dellinger,
Assistant Attorney General (June 28, 1995) (on file with author).
131. itL at 2097.
132. Id. at 2113-14. See also id at 2119 (Thomas J., concurring) ("[R]acial paternalism
... can be as pernicious as any other form of discrimination.").
133. Id at 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring).
134. Id at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 2121.
136. Justice O'Connor wrote, "[Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny
is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.' The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the
lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfor-
tunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in response to it." Id at 2117
(citation omitted). Justice Ginsburg wrote, "[c]ourt review can ensure that preferences are
not so large as to trammel unduly upon the opportunities of others or interfere too harshly
with legitimate expectations of persons in once-preferred groups." Id at 2136 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
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ulation treats one race differently from another, the regulation must
be strictly scrutinized to determine whether it meets a compelling gov-
ernmental interest which could not be met by a less restrictive alterna-
tive.137 Unless the governmental action is narrowly tailored to the
problem it addresses, it is impermissible.13s Both Justice O'Connor
and Justice Ginsburg have apparently concluded that affirmative ac-
tion plans, if properly designed, will pass this test.
Undoubtedly, one effect of Adarand is that some federal affirma-
tive action plans will be successfully challenged. Those that survive
will have the essential characteristics first identified in Bakke and
Weber; the use of gender or race-conscious decisionmaking will be jus-
tified as remedial, based on strong evidence of discrimination which
has had a continuing effect on the government's operations. These
plans will be narrowly tailored to respond to the discrimination to
which they are directed. They will be flexible, waivable, and tempo-
rary, and they will not upset the settled expectations of white and
male employees or contractors.
II. The Psychology of Discrimination
Given that the principal justification for affirmative action is the
need to provide effective remedies for discrimination, an examination
of the extent to which discrimination remains a problem in America
today is critical to any evaluation of the continuing need for affirma-
tive action. Over the past fifty years, psychologists, sociologists, polit-
ical scientists, and pollsters have revealed substantial evidence that
discrimination is pervasive in our society. 39 Discriminatory attitudes
are often unconscious, and unconscious discrimination has an enor-
mous impact on the lives of blacks and other people of color, and on
women of all races and ethnicities. There is considerable evidence
that because so much discrimination is motivated by unconscious be-
liefs and stereotypes, minority group members and women will be sig-
nificantly harmed by unintended, non-malicious discrimination. This
section describes that evidence and demonstrates why special efforts
beyond a commitment not to discriminate are required to overcome
discrimination.
137. See id. at 2117.
138. I-
139. I initially collected and reported on much of the data discussed in this Part in an
earlier article concerning the role of unconscious discrimination in employment decisions.
See David B. Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 899 (1993).
Surveys taken during the past fifty years demonstrate that views
expressed by whites about racial discrimination have dramatically
changed, and that virtually all whites in American society now profess
a commitment to non-discrimination, at least in public arenas such as
employment. If our society mirrored the expressed viewpoints of its
white members, prohibitions of race discrimination would be unneces-
sary. When more closely examined, however, the surveys demon-
strate a continuing high level of general racial prejudice held by whites
against blacks, Hispanics and Asians. Although the surveys show that
the percentage of whites openly supporting discrimination has
dropped considerably, surveys on implementation of civil rights and
more sophisticated surveys attempting to measure white stereotypes
about blacks demonstrate high levels of covert racism. These surveys
support the view that overt racism has lost favor socially, but racist
attitudes lie close beneath the surface of our society.
Field and laboratory experiments support the conclusions of the
more sophisticated surveys, which attempt to measure stereotyping in-
stead of overt racism, the level of racist behavior observable in such
experiments is disturbingly high. Given the wide variance between
expressions of overt racist principles and evidence of racist behavior,
it appears either that large numbers of whites are falsely denying their
consciously-held racist beliefs, or, more likely, that many acts of racist
behavior are motivated by unconscious, rather than intentional,
racism.
A. Survey Evidence Regarding Racial Attitudes of White Americans
Three national survey organizations have been conducting regu-
lar polls on the racial attitudes and beliefs of white adults over the
past five decades: the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at
the University of Chicago, the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at
the University of Michigan, and the Gallup Organization (Gallup). A
recent comprehensive study examines the trends exhibited by these
polls from 1942 through 1987.140 The data reported in the study sup-
ports the conclusion that at the level of consciously held attitudes
about blacks, there has been considerable progress in whites' state-
ments of principle regarding purely public civil rights, such as employ-
ment and public accommodations, but that these principles are not
expressed as strongly in areas of private life, such as marriage and
housing.
140. HOWARD SCHUMAN, ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA, TRENDS AND IN-
TERPRETATIONS (1988).
Summer 19961 UNDERSTANDING AFFIRMATIVE AMTON
948 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:921
In response to questions about the principle of non-discrimina-
tion in employment, the white response indicates that overt discrimi-
nation has lost all social acceptance. In 1944, only 45% of white
NORC respondents agreed that "[n]egroes should have as good a
chance as white people to get any kind of job"; 55% instead stated
that "white people should have the first chance."' 1 By 1963, the year
before the first major civil rights law of the century was enacted, those
favoring equal opportunity had risen to 85%, and by 1972, seven years
after the 1964 Civil Rights Act took effect, those in support of job
equality had risen to a nearly unanimous 97%.142 If those 97% of the
white population who believe, or profess to believe, in equal employ-
ment opportunity, acted in conformance with their beliefs, the prob-
lem of race discrimination in employment would largely disappear.
However, other surveys and experiments reveal a wide gap be-
tween the 97% support in principle and the number of whites re-
fraining from discrimination. First, support for the principle of non-
discrimination in employment does not translate into support for fed-
eral enforcement of employment discrimination laws. An ISR ques-
tion asking whether "the government in. Washington [should] see to it
that black people get fair treatment in jobs or leave these matters to
the states and local communities" found only 38% supporting federal
enforcement in 1964.'4 By 1974 the number had declined to 36%,'"
and by 1987 the number had declined even further, to 33%, with an-
other 33 % stating that they had no interest in the issue, and 34% stat-
ing that the federal government should not get involved. 45 In other
words, a plurality of the population surveyed would support the repeal
of Title VII.
This difference between white support for the principle of equal
opportunity and white support for federal enforcement of black em-
ployment rights is dramatic. It suggests that the 97% support in prin-
ciple is an empty gesture-that true white support for equal
employment opportunity is far lower. One could theorize, however,
that the difference merely reflects fiscal concerns, or a preference for
local enforcement of civil rights over federal intervention. Survey re-
sults on equal opportunities in housing, however, suggest that the dif-
ference is not fiscal or procedural, but substantive-that a substantial
141. Id. at 74-75 tbl. 3.1. Schuman eliminated the undecided and the non-responsive
respondents, except as otherwise noted. Id. at 73-76.
142. Id. The question was not asked after 1972. Id.
143. Id. at 88-91 tbl. 3.2 & fig. 3.4.
144. I&
145. See id at xii.
number of whites are willing to lend abstract support to civil rights
principles, but are opposed to seeing those principles carried out.
In surveys on open housing, 40% of the NORC respondents in
1963 strongly agreed that "[w]hite people have a right to keep blacks
out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and blacks should respect
that right," and another 21% slightly agreed.' 46 By 1982 the number
of strong supporters had dropped to 14%, while another 15% still
slightly agreed.147 In and of itself, 29% support for allowing housing
discrimination is strikingly high, but even more dramatic is that many
who do not support such discrimination are nonetheless unwilling to
outlaw it. In six NORC surveys between 1973 and 1983, a significant
(if declining) majority, ranging from 66% in 1972 to 56% in 1983 sup-
ported a hypothetical law providing "that a homeowner can decide for
himself who to sell his house to, even if he prefers not to sell to
blacks" over a law providing "that a homeowner cannot refuse to sell
to someone because of their race or color."'" In 1984, the number
supporting an open housing law first reached 50%, dropping again in
1986, and rising back to 50% in 1987.149 Since government enforce-
ment of the law was not an issue in these survey questions, the fiscal
or states' rights explanations are not available here to explain the dis-
parity between support for equality and support for outlawing dis-
crimination. The 50% opposition is not opposition to government
intervention; it is opposition to the existence of a legal right to open
housing.
Similarly, when ISR informed its subjects in 1974 that public ac-
commodations discrimination was prohibited by law, and then asked
whether "the government should support the right of black people to
go to any hotel or restaurant they can afford, or should it stay out of
this matter," 20% replied that the government should not enforce the
law, another 14% replied they were uninterested in whether the law
was enforced, and 66% favored enforcement. 50
In more private areas, even civil rights principles divorced from
enforcement find substantial white resistance. In the area of intermar-
riage, surveys conducted as late as 1983 showed 34% of the NORC
respondents favoring laws prohibiting racial intermarriage.15 ' That is,
one in three white Americans not only believed that marriage be-
146. Id. at 74-75 tbl. 3.1.
147. Id
148. Id. at 88-89 tbl. 3.2.
149. Id at xii.
150. Id. at 88-90 tbl. 3.2.
151. Id. at 74-76 tbl. 3.1.
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tween blacks and whites was wrong, but further believed that it should
be illegal. While such laws carried 62% support in 1963, the support
had dropped to 29% in 1977 before rebounding in 1980 and 1982.152
This rebounding was even stronger in response to the question, "[a]re
you in favor of desegregation, strict segregation, or something in be-
tween?' 5 3 Given the opportunity to support something other than
desegregation without supporting strict segregation, a full 60% of
white ISR respondents favored the "in between" in 1978.'1 4 Although
the number favoring strict segregation slipped from 25% in 1964 to
15% in 1978, only 35% of the 1978 respondents favored full
desegregation. l s
A few surveys, most notably a series of questions asked by
NORC between 1942 and 1968, attempted to understand the source of
white racism by measuring white stereotypes about black Ameri-
cans. 156 Beginning in 1942 NORC asked "[i]n general, do you believe
that Negroes are as intelligent as white people-that is, can they learn
things just as well if they are given the same education and train-
ing?"' 57 In 1942, 53% of respondents answered that blacks were not
as intelligent as whites.'58 By 1970, that number had declined to a still
very sizable 23%. 1 9 But here again, the 77% of the whites who re-
sponded that they believed blacks to be as intelligent as whites may be
overstated, because the contrary response now may be recognized as
socially unacceptable even among those whites who continue to be-
lieve it to be true.
A 1990 NORC study, conducted after the Schuman study was
published, sheds further light on racial attitudes of whites toward
blacks in the areas of intelligence and a number of other topics in
which stereotypes abound. 60 White subjects were asked to rate vari-
ous ethnic groups' 6' regarding certain character traits, such as unintel-





156. Important work in this area was done in the 1940s and 1950s by Gordon Allport of
Harvard. See GORDON W. ALLPORT, TiE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954).
157. SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 140, at 74-75 tbl 3.1, 118-19 tbl. 3.4.
158. Id. at 118-19 tbl. 3.4.
159. Id
160. TOM W. SMITH, NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CTR., ETHNIC IMAGES, GENERAL
SOCIAL SURVEY TOPICAL REPORT No. 19 (1990).
161. The groups were whites, Jews, blacks, Asian Americans, Hispanics, and Southern
whites. Id. at 2.
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scale of 1 to 7, and asked to place each ethnic group rated on the
appropriate point of the scale for each characteristic. Unlike the ear-
lier polls reported by Schuman et al., the 1990 NORC study carefully
avoided using declarative statements with which the subjects could
agree or disagree, thereby reducing the likelihood that people would
censor themselves from stating socially unacceptable views. For ex-
ample, subjects were not asked the 1942-68 question "[d]o you think
Negroes are as intelligent as white people?' 1 62 They were instead
asked to generally rate whites in intelligence, and then to do the same
for blacks and other minorities.163
Several of the resulting comparisons are illustrative of the depth
of racial stereotyping in America today. Asked to rate racial groups
on the characteristic of intelligence, 53.2% rated blacks less intelligent
than whites, with 40.5% stating no difference."6 An almost identical
53.5% rated Hispanics as less intelligent than whites, with 40.1% rat-
ing the groups as the same.165 A smaller but still significant 36.3%
rated Asians less intelligent than whites, with 44.6% rating no
difference.166
On the question of hard-working/lazy, 62.2% of the subjects rated
blacks as less hard-working than whites, while 31.9% rated them
equally; 54.1% rated Hispanics less hard-working than whites, while
37.2% rated them equally; and 34.2% said Asians were less hard-
working than whites, while 30.3% said they were more hard-working,
and 35.8% said there was no difference. 67 The distribution was also
nearly flat regarding Asians when the respondents were asked to rate
the propensity for violence; however, 56.1% rated blacks more vio-
lence prone, with 30.0% rating no difference, and 49.5% said Hispan-
ics were more violence-prone, while 34.0% found no difference. 6 s
On the question of patriotism, 50.6% rated blacks less patriotic than
whites, while 46.6% rated blacks and whites equally. 69 Asians were
viewed as even less patriotic-55.2% said they were less patriotic than
whites, while 38.6% said there was no difference. 70 Finally, 60.4% of
162. SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 140, at 118 tbl. 3.4.
163. SMITH, supra note 160, at 2-4.
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the respondents said that Hispanics were less patriotic, while 35.6%
said there was no difference.
171
To appreciate the significance of such a high number of whites
viewing minority group members as less intelligent and less hard-
working than whites, consider the effect in the area of employment
discrimination. It is likely that employers selecting employees will
choose those whom they view as the most intelligent and hard-work-
ing. In matters of employee evaluation, stereotypes may become self-
fulfilling prophecies by way of suggestion, since most people are prone
to seeing what they expect to see. An employer is thus likely, at the
97% level, to subscribe to a belief in the principle of equal employ-
ment opportunity, to articulate that belief, and to believe she is apply-
ing it. Yet she is nonetheless far more likely than not to view black
and Hispanic employees and applicants, and somewhat more likely to
view Asian employees and applicants, as less intelligent and less hard-
working than are whites. If she applies these stereotypes in evaluating
applicants and employees, the resulting decisions are likely to result in
substantial discrimination against the minority employees.
The 1990 NORC study tells us much about the attitudes of whites
toward minorities, and the reasons whites discriminate. As long as
whites believe in minority inferiority, or to flip the term, white
supremacy, they should be expected to discriminate. For the most
part, however, whites do not view discrimination as the cause of mi-
nority subjugation. A 1989 study based on General Social Survey
(GSS) interviews with over 6,000 non-black respondents asked di-
rectly why blacks are disadvantaged. 7 The question read:
On the average blacks have worse jobs, income and housing
than white people. Do you think these differences are...
A. Mainly due to discrimination.
B. Because most blacks have less in-born ability to learn.
C. Because most blacks don't have the chance for education
that it takes to rise out of poverty.
D. Because most blacks just don't have the motivation or will
power to pull themselves out of poverty. 73
Of the respondents, 9% attributed black disadvantage to inequality in
education, and 21% blamed discrimination. 74 But many more
blamed African Americans for their own predicament: 20.8% be-
171. Id.
172. James R. Kluegel, Trends in Whites' Explanations of the Black-White Gap in Socio-
economic Status, 1977-1989, 55 AM. Soc. REv. 512 (1990).
173. Id. at 513-14 (emphasis in original).
174. Id. at 517 tbl. 3.
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lieved that the cause of racial disparities was inborn ability, while
43.8% opined that the reason was lack of motivation. 175
B. Laboratory Experiments Measuring Discrimination
Although the 1989 GSS survey and the 1990 NORC survey, as
well as many of the earlier surveys on implementation of civil rights
laws, disclose an extremely high level of white racism, one obvious
problem with survey data is whether the respondents are being truth-
ful in their answers. As high as the numbers are, the disparity be-
tween the questions on principle and those on implementation
suggests that survey results generally may underestimate the true level
of white racism because the respondents are concerned about appear-
ing to be racist. If overt racism is socially unacceptable behavior, per-
sons being surveyed, even anonymously, may be reluctant to reveal
their true beliefs.
This is borne out by a series of experiments conducted in the
1970s in which white subjects were polled regarding their views on
blacks, with half hooked up to a device (a "bogus pipeline") that was
described as a sophisticated lie detector. 176 The subjects attached to
the bogus pipeline admitted holding far more negative stereotypes
than did those merely asked to rate racial characteristics. For exam-
ple, Sigall and Page found that the subjects hooked up to the bogus
pipeline described blacks as less "honest" and "intelligent," and more
"lazy," "stupid" and "physically dirty" than did those subjects not
hooked up to the device.177 Allen demonstrated that whites who had
been rated as "unprejudiced" in a paper test on racial attitudes
showed a significant reduction of expressed admiration of black public
figures when hooked up to the bogus pipeline. 78 In Carver's study,
the subjects were asked to characterize a fellow student based on a
175. Id.
176. The studies are documented in Harold Sigall & Richard Page, Current Stereotypes,
A Little Fading, A Little Faking, 18 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 247, 247-255 (1971);
Ben P. Allen, Social Distance and Admiration Reactions of "Unprejudiced" Whites, 43 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 709, 709-726 (1975); and Charles S. Carver et al.,
Favorable Evaluations of Blacks and the Handicapped: Positive Prejudice, Unconscious De-
nial, or Social Desirability?, 8 J. APPLmD Soc. PSYCHOL. 97, 97-106 (1978). The studies are
described and interpreted in Faye Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and
White Discrimination and Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 546, 546-563
(1980).
177. See Sigall, supra note 176, at 250-51. Both groups of whites, those hooked up to
the machine and those simply asked to rate characteristics, rated blacks negatively as com-
pared to whites. Id.
178. See Allen, supra note 176, at 717-23 tbl. 4. In a paper and pencil test, the "unpreju-
diced" whites rated the black public figures 1.40 points (on a 10 point scale) higher than a
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transcript of an interview. 179 The transcripts were identical, save that
half identified the interviewee as black.180 Those not hooked up to
the bogus pipeline actually gave the black student a higher rating than
the student whose race was not identified, but those persuaded that
their "true feelings" were being measured rated the black student sig-
nificantly lower than the other.' 8 ' These results suggest a high level of
dissembling by many survey participants, and raise the question of
whether the data revealed in the subtle 1990 NORC survey under-
states the true level of white racism.
One response to the limitations of survey data has been to design
experiments that measure behavior, rather than attitude. Such tests
can both ferret out conscious racism that the subject would prefer not
to admit-as in the bogus pipeline experiments-and reveal uncon-
scious racism, which may be unknown to the subject. In 1980, Crosby,
Bromley, and Saxe examined a large number 182 of field experiments
conducted since the mid-1960s which attempted to test for racism by
testing for the presence of discriminatory behavior. These experi-
ments attempted to observe white subjects in an interracial situation
where their conduct, if uninfluenced by racism, would be expected to
be similar to their conduct with other whites. 83 The results present
strong evidence that the reduction in racist views expressed in surveys
does not foretell a corresponding reduction in racist behavior.
Thirty of the studies reviewed by Crosby were "helping behavior
studies" in which white subjects were faced with people (half of whom
were white, half of whom were black) posing as needing assistance.
For example, in a number of studies a person posing as a shopper
would drop a bag of groceries; the study measured whether white
passers-by were more likely to help if the person in need were white
or black.' 84 In others, a person would pose as a motorist in distress to
measure whether white drivers were more likely to help blacks or
whites.' 5 In Crosby's analysis of these experiments, she found that in
matched set of white public figures. Once hooked to the machine, they rated the white
public figures 0A6 points higher. Id.
179. See Carver, supra note 176, at 101-103.
180. Id
181. Id
182. Crosby chose 46 such studies that utilized "unobtrusive" experiments-experi-
ments in which subjects were not aware that they were being studied, or were not aware
that the study was examining discrimination. Crosby, supra note 176, at 546-47.
183. Idt
184. See id. at 549, 551 tbl. 1.
185. See idt at 551 tbl. 1.
40% of the studies white subjects showed discrimination against
blacks. 86
High as it is, this 40% measure of discrimination actually may be
understated due to the social scientists' conservative analysis of what
constitutes non-discrimination. In the shopping bag experiment, for
example, Crosby reports the experimenter's conclusion that the white
subjects showed no discrimination in their willingness to help the
shoppers whose bags broke, categorizing it in the "no discrimination"
classification. 187 But, as Crosby notes, while whites and blacks were
offered assistance in equal numbers, the amount of assistance offered
was not equal. 8 8 Rather, 63% of the time that white subjects were
aiding white women, the subjects gave complete help, picking up all of
the groceries, while 70% of the time when white subjects helped black
women, they gave only perfunctory help, picking up only a few pack-
ages.' 8 9 When complete help and perfunctory help are distinguished,
the study demonstrates that whites are twice as likely to help other
whites as they are blacks.
In most of the helping behavior studies analyzed by Crosby, the
subject was engaged in a face to face encounter with the person need-
ing help. But in eight of the thirty studies, the encounter was remote.
In comparing the face to face experiments with the remote experi-
ments, Crosby found that in 32% of the face to face studies, there was
white discrimination against blacks, while in 75% of the remote stud-
ies there was such discrimination. 190 This disparity supports the view
that when engaging in public activity, whites may be more careful to
avoid discriminating, but when acting privately or anonymously, most
whites will discriminate against blacks.
One particular study which supports this analysis was especially
striking. An envelope containing a completed graduate school appli-
cation was left at an airport phone booth.19 1 The application con-
tained a stamped, addressed envelope for submission to graduate
school, a note to "Dad" asking him to please mail the application, and,
as part of the application, a photograph of the candidate.' 92 White
adults were observed picking up the application in the phone booth
186. Id at 549, 550-52 tbl. 1.
187. Id. at 549.
188. Id.
189. The analysis is calculated by Thomas F. Pettigrew in New Patterns of Racism: The
Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 673, 688-89 (1985).
190. Crosby, supra note 176, at 549, 552 tbl. 2.
191. Id at 549, 551 tbl. 1.
192. Id.
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and inspecting it.193 They were found to be significantly more likely to
mail the application when the applicant was white than when the ap-
plicant was black. 94 Crosby theorized that white helping behavior
was more prevalent in face to face encounters because "[w]hites today
hold prejudiced attitudes, but ... they inhibit expression of this preju-
dice when the possibility of negative consequences is great. In the
more removed and anonymous situations (Type 2), discrimination is
much more likely to emerge."'19
In addition to the helping behavior studies, another set of studies
examined by Crosby measured nonverbal behavior to test for racism.
Each of the four experiments in this group found measurable white
racism. 196 For example, in one experiment white male students at
Princeton were asked to interview a white or black high school stu-
dent.197 The interviewees were trained participants (confederates), in-
structed to behave in a like fashion. 98 As Crosby reports, "[t]he
subjects sat further away from the black confederates than from the
white confederates, made more speech errors when talking to the
blacks than when talking to the whites, and terminated the black in-
terviews sooner than the white interviews. In short, a marked degree
of nonverbal discriminatory behavior was obtained."'199
A laboratory study from 1976 demonstrated the impact of racial
stereotyping on perception.20 0 White undergraduates viewed a video-
tape on a monitor in which one participant shoved another.2° 1 When
the person doing the shoving was black, the subjects described the
shove as violent, but when the person doing the shoving was white, it
was described as harmless "playing around. ''20 2
C. Discrimination and Psychological Development in Children
The psychology of racism is not limited to adults; It begins at an
early age. A 1993 study of white children attending preschool and
elementary schools in predominantly white middle class neighbor-
hoods in Pennsylvania and Minnesota examined the degree of racial
193. Id
194. Id
195. L at 549.
196. Id. at 555-56.
197. Id at 555.
198. Id
199. Id




stereotyping in children aged four through nine.20 3 Asked to assign
traits like "dirty" or "clean," "smart" or "stupid," many engaged in
significant racial stereotyping.2 4 For example, 72% associated clean-
liness with white people; only 19% associated it with black people.2 "5
Similarly, 79% associated dirtiness with blacks, 16% with whites, and
64% associated stupidity with blacks, while 27% associated it with
whites.2° When these children were told stories in which black char-
acters acted in conflict with the prevailing stereotypes, such as stories
where blacks were hard working and whites were lazy, they were
more likely to either forget the story or, worse yet, to switch the roles
in remembering, recalling the black character as the lazy one.207
A similar study of three to six year olds measured the likelihood
that children would find more humor in the depiction of an accident
involving a black or Hispanic child rather than a white child.208 White
children found the accident depictions funnier when the victim was
non-white; so did the black and Hispanic children.20 9 The authors
concluded that white children had a stronger racial identity than black
and Hispanic children.21 0 To put this differently, it appears that by
age six, non-white children have internalized the racism of our society.
This observation was manifested further in another study where non-
white kindergarten and second grade children were found to identify
with pictures of white children as those most like themselves, most
like they wanted to be, and most like they would want their friends to
be.2
11
D. The Psychology of Sex Stereotyping
The psychology of sex stereotyping is also important in under-
standing discrimination. Although women are legally entitled to
equality of treatment in the workplace and in business transactions,
sex stereotyping acts as a potent roadblock in preventing equal treat-
203. Rebecca S. Bigler & Lynn S. Liben, A Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Ra-
cial Stereotyping and Reconstructive Memory in Euro-American Children, 1993 CHILIo
DEV. 1507.
204. Id. at 1516.
205. Id. at 1517 tbl. Al.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1516.
208. Paul E. McGhee & Nelda S. Duffey, Children's Appreciation of Humor Victimiz-
ing Different Racial-Ethnic Groups, 14 J. OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 29 (1983).
209. Id. at 35-37.
210. Id.
211. Mary A. Newman et al., Ethnic Awareness in Children: NotA Unitary Concept, 144
J. OF GENETIC PSYCHOL. 103-112 (1983).
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ment even among those who would obey the law.212 Studies have re-
peatedly demonstrated that women are viewed as having less
leadership ability than men, as less assertive than men, less willing to
take risks than men, less willing to take a stand than men, and less
willing to defend their beliefs than men.213 While measurable differ-
ences in personality between men and women do exist, the prevailing
stereotypes grossly exaggerate the true differences, to the considera-
ble disadvantage of women.21 4 These stereotypes are not held only by
men-as a group, women see themselves as less able than men in busi-
ness and workplace skills.215 These stereotypes significantly affect wo-
men's occupational aspirations, entry into occupations, and treatment
and advancement within occupations.1 6
IV. Why We Need Affirmative Action
A. Introduction
Given that the justification for affirmative action is the existence
of discrimination that requires a remedy, we cannot determine
whether affirmative action is necessary without considering the extent
to which discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and gender continues
to affect American society. Section III demonstrated the psychologi-
cal foundation of contemporary discrimination and the likelihood that
its victims will be women and minorities. Yet those who oppose af-
firmative action argue that the most likely victims of discrimination
today are white men, and many Americans agree with that assess-
ment.217 This section is a refutation of that argument.
212. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that evidence
of sex stereotyping is sufficient to prove violation of Title VII).
213. Carol Lynn Martin, A Ratio Measure of Sex Stereotyping, 52 J. OF PERSONALrrY
AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 489, 492 tbl. 1 (1987).
214. Id at 497; see also Richard A. Fabes & Mary R. Laner, How the Sexes Perceive
Each Other: Advantages and Disadvantages, 15 SEX ROLES 129 (1986).
215. Jayne E. Stake, Gender Differences and Similarities in Self-Concept Within Every-
day Life Contexts, 16 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q. 349-63 (1992).
216. Thomas L. Ruble et al., Sex Stereotypes: Occupational Barriers for Women, 27 AM.
BEHAV. ScIENTIST 339-56 (1984).
217. See, e.g., The Newsweek Pol March 23-24, 1995, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 3, 1995, at 34
(finding that twice as many respondents "think whites [are] losing out because affirmative
action is a bigger problem" than "think blacks [are] losing out because racial discrimina-
tion is a bigger problem in the workplace"); The Newsweek Poll February 1-3, 1995, NEws-
WEEK, Feb. 13, 1995, at 34 (finding that 54% of whites agree that we have "gone too far in
pushing equal rights in this country," while 64% of blacks disagree); MOLLYANN BRODIE,
Thn FOUR AMERICAS: GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY THROUGH THE EYES OF
AmERICA'S MULTI-RACIAL AND MULI'i-ETHNIC SOCIETY 100 (1995) (finding that 37% of
white respondents believe that whites are losing out to minorities in the workplace due to
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By examining the actual differences in treatment between men
and women and between whites and minority group members in the
areas of education, employment, housing, health care, economic op-
portunity, crime and poverty, it becomes clear that race, ethnicity, and
gender play a powerful role in determining treatment and privilege in
American life-that to be black or brown and/or female is an enor-
mous disadvantage in gaining access to the basic necessities of life.
Because of the massive discrimination practiced today against women
and minorities throughout American life, I conclude that affirmative
action remains a necessary remedy.
In considering the data presented here, it is worth noting that
white Americans have an exaggerated view of the number of non-
whites in the United States, which may contribute to a warped view of
the power of minority groups. In a recent survey, white respondents
estimated the white population of the United States at under 50%,
while it is actually 74% as of the 1992 census.218 Whites estimated the
black population at just over twice its actual size-23.8% instead of
11.8%.219 The Hispanic population, which is actually 9.5%, was esti-
mated to be 14.7%, while the Asian American population, which is
3.1%, was thought to be 10.8%.0 The white poll respondents were
almost evenly split on whether most blacks have the same standard of
living and opportunities as whites (47%) or have a lower standard of
living and fewer opportunities than whites (51%).221 Moreover, when
framed entirely in terms of economic opportunity, 68% of the white
respondents believe that blacks have the same or more opportunity as
do white Americans to be "really successful and wealthy. '2  Simi-
larly, 64% of the white respondents stated that access to health care
for blacks is just as good or better than it is for whites.21 Only 30%
responded that access for blacks is worse than access for whites. 4
While 51% stated that access to health care is better for Hispanics
than for white Americans, only 42% believe it is worse. 5 A majority
of the whites polled believe that the average black American is just as
well off or better off than the average white American in terms of
unfair preferences, and that this is a bigger problem than minorities facing discrimination
and lack of opportunity for advancement).
218. BRODIE, supra note 217, at 78, 103.
219. Id
220. Id.
221. Id at 81.
222. Id at 77.
223. Id at 81-82.
224. Id
225. Id. at 83-84.
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education, and an equal number believe the average Hispanic Ameri-
can is as well off or better off as believe that the average Hispanic
American is worse off.22
6
B. Education
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of affirmative action is the
consideration of race or ethnicity as a factor in university admissions.
Despite the Court's holding in Bakke that race may be considered as
one factor among others in a school's attempt to admit a diverse stu-
dent body, many argue that school admissions should be based on
grades and standardized test scores alone. These critics overlook the
fact that in the area of elementary and secondary education, minority
children receive dramatically unequal opportunities compared to
whites. Most black and Hispanic school children attend de facto seg-
regated schools which are over-crowded, under-funded, and badly
maintained. 27 Perversely, those children whose needs are greatest
are given the worst education. In his landmark study, Savage Inequal-
ities, Jonathan Kozol exhaustively studied the spending and facilities
in a number of major American communities and found that the edu-
cational services provided and money spent on education were closely
linked to race, and that white children were provided with far, far
more than non-white children.228
In Chicago, for example, Kozol found that the largely white sub-
urban schools were far superior by any measure to the largely non-
white city schools. Examining student/teacher ratios, physical facili-
ties, teacher salaries, library and text book availability, and counseling
programs, the differences were dramatic. In 1989, Chicago spent ap-
proximately $5,265 per student; the largely white suburbs north of the
city spent as much as $9,300.229 The City's political leaders had aban-
doned the public schools, sending their own children to private
schools; Governor Thompson, opposing more aid to Chicago's public
schools, explained revealingly, "[w]e can't keep throwing money into
a black hole."2 0 %
Kozol's findings were similar in New Jersey, where largely non-
white Camden spent $3,538 per pupil in 1989, while its next-door
neighbor, largely white Cherry Hill, spent $5,981, and nearby
226. Id at 81-84.
227. See generally JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES (1992).
228. See generally id
229. Id. at 54, 236 tbl. I.
230. Id. at 53.
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Princeton, again largely white, spent $7,725.P31 "What does money
buy for children in New Jersey?" Kozol asks, then replies:
For high school students in East Orange, where the track team
has no field and therefore has to do its running in the hallways
of the school, [money] buys a minimum of exercise. . . . In
mostly upper-middle [class] Montclair, on the other hand, it
buys two recreation fields, four gyms, a dance floor, a wrestling
room, a weight room with a universal gym, tennis courts, a track,
and indoor areas for fencing. It also buys 13 full-time physical
education teachers for its 1,900 students. East Orange High
School, by comparison, has four physical education teachers for
2,000 students, 99.9 percent of whom are black.3 2
In New York, Kozol found that the average 1990 expenditure per
pupil in the largely non-white New York City public schools was
$7,299; in largely white suburbs on Long Island the funding levels fre-
quently rose to over $14,000 and in some cases to over $15,000.233
Even within the city, white enclaves received far more resources than
non-white communities. In one illustration, Kozol compares two
schools he visited in the same school district in the Bronx.234 The first,
P.S. 261, is in a dark, largely windowless building-a former roller-
skating rink. The building's capacity is 900, but 1,300 students are en-
rolled, with classes as large as 37 students. Because there are not
enough classrooms, classes "double up." Kozol observed a class of
sixth graders sharing their classroom with a class of bilingual second
graders, with 63 children and adults speaking different languages as
they shared a classroom designed for 20. It is, however, the only class-
room in the school with a window. Because text-books are scarce, the
children must share them. The school library, also windowless, holds
just 700 volumes, none of which are reference books. There is no re-
cess because there is no playground. P.S. 261 is 90% black and His-
panic; the remaining 10% of the students are Asian, Middle Eastern,
and white.
In the same school district, a few miles away from P.S. 261, is P.S.
24.23 5 The school is in a white enclave called Riverdale. The school is
light and airy. It stands next door to a playground. Behind it are
sports fields. The school library, with almost 8,000 volumes, looks out
on a park. A parents' group staffs the library and raises money to
231. Id at 236 tbl. II.
232. Id. at 157.
233. Id at 83-84, 120, 123, 237 tbl. IV.
234. The descriptions of the two schools is taken from KOZOL, supra note 227, at 85-98.
235. New York City's schools are divided into 32 districts. Both schools are in District
10. Id at 84.
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support its collection. Encyclopedias are placed in the classrooms,
where classes of 22-23 students study. P.S. 24 serves 825 students.
Approximately 130 are black or Hispanic, and virtually all of them are
assigned to "special" classes, having been diagnosed as "retarded."
The remaining 700 students are mostly white, with a few Asians.
In Detroit, Kozol reports, where the schools are almost 90%
black, they are
so poorly funded that three classes have to share a single set of
books in elementary schools. "It's not until the sixth grade," the
Detroit Free Press reports, "that every student has a textbook."
At MacKenzie High School in Detroit, courses in word process-
ing are taught without word processors.... Of an entering ninth
grade class of 20,000 students in Detroit, only 7,000 graduate
from high school, and, of these, only 500 have the preparation to
go on to college.23 6
In 1988, Detroit spent approximately $3,600 per child for the schools,
while the largely white suburbs of Grosse Point, Bloomfield Hills and
Birmingham spent between $5,700 and $6,400.237
In California, the courts have ordered that spending by school
districts be equalized in order to eliminate the imbalance and its fun-
damental unfairness.238 Nonetheless, some disparities are permitted,
and spending in 1990 ranged from less than $3,000 per child to over
$7,500 per child.239 In Texas, where a legal challenge to equalize
school spending was defeated,240 spending in 1991 ranged from less
than $2,000 per child to approximately $19,000 per child.24' In San
Antonio, with a large Hispanic school population, the 1989 school
spending was pegged at $2,800 per child, while in the largely white
enclave of Alamo Heights, which is completely surrounded by San
Antonio but operates an independent school district, the spending per
child was $4,600.242
Federal programs sending aid to poor school districts undoubt-
edly help, and a recent report by the Department of Education con-
cludes that because of such programs, we now spend more money on
236. Id. at 198.
237. Id.
238. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728 (1976).
239. KOZOL, supra note 227, at 222.
240. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). A decision requir-
ing equalization was handed down by the Texas Supreme Court in 1989, but full equaliza-
tion has not yet occurred. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W. 2d 391
(1989).
241. KozoL, supra note 227, at 223.
242. Id. at 224.
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primarily minority schools than we do on majority white schools.243
The authors were surprised at this finding and called for further study
of the question.244 Their report also determined, however, that there
are more students per teacher in minority districts and poor dis-
tricts,245 and that total revenues per student are far lower in poor dis-
tricts than in wealthy districts.246
Attracting committed teachers to black and Hispanic schools is,
of course, important. Also important is helping teachers, particularly
white teachers, overcome their own biases. Numerous studies have
demonstrated that even well-meaning white teachers often bring to
the classroom stereotypical views of their minority students that exac-
erbate the problem of racial and ethnic discrimination.247 Regardless
of a child's social class standing, teachers more often than not expect
black children to fail and white children to succeed, and treat them
accordingly.248 A compilation of studies concludes that white teachers
see black children as "high strung" and "rebellious," while black
teachers see the same children as "energetic" and "ambitious."24 9
These differences are important because students whose teachers ex-
pect them to succeed are more likely to succeed; those whose teachers
expect them to fail probably wil.25 0 A 1991 study of the preferences
of white fourth grade teachers found a distinct preference not to be
assigned to teach black male children described as "nonsubmissive"
and "independent. ' '25 1 The teachers viewed such children as less
promising academically than other students with equal academic
records, and as potentially more disruptive. 2
In one notable study on self-fulfilling prophecy in education, psy-
chologist Ray Rist observed a classroom of students over a three year
period.25 Their kindergarten teacher sorted them on the eighth day
243. THOMAS B. PARRISH, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DISPARI-
TIES IN PUBLIC SCHOOL DisTmcr SPENDING 1989-90, at 59 fig. 19 (1995).
244. Id. at xxiii.
245. Id at 39-40, 42.
246. Id at 62 (districts with poorest households spend 29% less per student, even after
federal assistance, than districts with wealthiest households).
247. See, e-g., CAROLINE PERSELL, EDUCATION AND INEQuALrrY (1977) (compiling
studies on subject).
248. Id at 104-05.
249. Id at 113-14.
250. Id. at 131-32.
251. Sandra I. Ross & Jeffery M. Jackson, Teachers' Expectations for Black Males' and
African Black Females' Academic Achievement, 17 PERSONALrrY AND SoC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 78 (1991).
252. Id
253. See WLLIAM RYAN, EQUALITY 130-32 (1984).
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of school into "fast learners" and "slow learners." Her evaluation
held true as they progressed through school; by second grade those
deemed fast learners were far ahead. Rist observed that the initial
evaluation could be explained based on a few discernable factors. The
"fast learners" were the neat, clean, verbal kids from middle-class
families. Why did they do so much better than the others? Rist ob-
served that once they were tracked, the teacher taught almost exclu-
sively to the "fast learners," rarely interacting with the "slow learners"
except to discipline them.
In another famous self-fufilling prophecy experiment, Rosenthal
and Jacobson randomly selected 20% of the students at a San Fran-
cisco school and falsely told their teachers that they had been identi-
fied by test results as "spurters"-children who would abruptly start
to do better in their school work." 4 Most of the "spurters" spurted,
showing tremendous gains in their test scores. Their teachers identi-
fied them as better adjusted and more curious. By contrast, children
not identified as "spurters" who spurted anyway were viewed as dis-
ruptive and poorly adjusted.
Expectations and tracking are closely related to race and ethnic-
ity. In 1982, white public school students were almost three times as
likely to be tracked in "gifted/talented" programs than black students,
and almost four times as likely as Hispanic students. 255 Tracking in
programs for the "mentally retarded" was the reverse; black students
were over three times as likely to be labeled "Educable Mentally Re-
tarded," and for Hispanic students the increased likelihood was over
25%. 2 6 In the area of school discipline, Jennifer Hochschild reports
that "[b]lacks in elementary school are three times as likely to be sus-
pended as their white peers, and secondary school blacks are twice as
likely to be suspended. On average, blacks are suspended at a
younger age, for a longer period, and more times than whites. ''2 7
The results of this discrimination in education are hardly surpris-
ing, but they are dramatic. As of 1984, 42% of black teenagers, but
fewer than 10% of white teenagers, were functionally illiterate.5 8 A
1995 study reported that a white high school graduate is far more
likely to attend college than is a black or Hispanic high school gradu-
254. See id.
255. Robert E. England, et al., Barriers to Equal Opportunity: Educational Practices
and Minority Students, 23 URB. AFI. Q. 635, 640 tbl. 1.
256. kd.; see also JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, TnE N~w AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 31 (1984).
257. HocHscILD, supra note 256, at 32.
258. Id at 21.
ate.2s9 And a white high school graduate is over twice as likely to
graduate from college as a black high school graduate, and almost
three times as likely as an Hispanic high school graduate.260 For His-
panics, that gap is growing. In 1970, 5% of Hispanic Americans and
11.6% of non-Hispanic Americans held college degrees; by 1994, the
figures had grown to 9% of the Hispanic population and 24% of the
non-Hispanic population.26'
Despite all the controversy surrounding affirmative action admis-
sions to colleges, more white students gain entry to Harvard College
through special admission programs as "legacies"-the children of
alumni-than do the total number of black, Hispanic, and Native
American students altogether, including those admitted through the
regular admissions program and those admitted through the special
admissions programs for the disadvantaged.2 62 At both Harvard and
Yale, legacy applicants, who are overwhelmingly white and affluent,
are accepted at over twice the overall admissions rate.263 The Office
of Civil Rights of the United States Department of Education con-
cluded that Harvard's preference for legacy admissions had a discrimi-
natory impact on Asian American applicants, but further determined
that the preferences were legitimate because they were long-standing
and were not a pretext for discrimination.264
The preference for legacies in college admissions is exacerbated
by the relationship between family income and SAT scores. Average
SAT scores rise dramatically with family income, from a mean total of
766 out of 1600 points for the children of families earning under
$10,000 a year, to a mean total of 1,000 for those with family incomes
above $70,000 a year.265 The close relationship between race and pov-
erty266 guarantees that blacks and Hispanics will congregate at the low
end of the SAT ladder, while the upper end will be largely white.
In sum, black and Hispanic children suffer substantial discrimina-
tion in our public schools. They attend largely separate and unequal
schools; they are disproportionately tracked into classes for slow
259. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REVIEw, supra note 4, at 12-13.
260. ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UN-
EQUAL 235 (1993).
261. See Steven A. Holmes, Census Report Finds Hispanic Americans Lagging Further
in College Degrees, N.Y. TMEs, July 27, 1995, at A10.
262. Lamb, supra note 14, at 504.
263. Id. at 503 tbl. 1., 505 tbl. 3.
264. Id. at 502.
265. David K. Shipler, My Equal Opportunity, Your Free Lunch, N.Y. TMES, March 5,
1995, § 4 (Magazine), at 1, 16.
266. See infra Part IV.H.
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learners or the "educable mentally retarded;" their teachers give less
to them and expect less of them; they are more likely to be disciplined;
and they are more likely to drop out. Although minority students re-
ceive some assistance in college admissions from affirmative action
programs, white students are more likely to benefit from special ad-
missions preferences, based on their relationship to alumni, than are
minority students based on race or ethnicity. Despite the existence of
affirmative action, white high school graduates are far more likely to
attend college than are minority students.
C. Employment
Blacks, Hispanics and Asian Americans earn substantially less
than do whites, and in some respects things are getting worse. In
1980, the average black male worker earned $751 for every $1,000
earned by a white male worker.267 By 1990 it had dropped to $731.268
Higher education helps, but not much. In 1990 the average black
male college graduate earned $798 for every $1,000 earned by a white
male college graduate.269 Those who attended at least one year of
graduate school dropped to $771.270 In 1979, Chinese American men
with college degrees earned approximately $862 for every $1,000
earned by comparably educated white men.2 71 For Japanese Ameri-
can men with college degrees, the comparable figure was approxi-
mately $944.272 In 1990, Hispanic men earned $810 for every $1,000
earned by similarly educated white men.273
Women of all races continue to earn substantially less than men.
In the 1960's women earned 60% of what men earned on average; by
1993, it had risen only to 72%.274 The average woman with a masters
degree earns the same amount as the average man with an associate
(junior college) degree.27s Hispanic women earn less than 65% of the
wages earned by white men at the same education level.276 An His-
panic woman with a college degree earns, on average, less than a
267. HACKER, supra note 260, at 101.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 95.
270. Id.
271. Min Zhou & Yoshinori Kamo, An Analysis of Earnings Patterns for Chinese, Japa-
nese, and Non-Hispanic Caucasian Males in the United States, 35 Soc. Q. 581, 591 tbl. 2
(1994).
272. ld.
273. AFFIRMATIVE ACMION REVIEW, supra note 4, at 14.
274. ld.
275. Id. at 24.
276. Id- at 15.
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white man with only a high school degree.277 As of 1995, black wo-
men earn 10% less than white women and 36% less than white men,
while Hispanic women earn 24% less than white women and 46% less
than white men.278 Almost two thirds of all working women earn less
than $20,000 annually-over one third earn less than $10,000.279
Although white men make up only 43% of the workforce,2 0 they
constitute 97% of the top executives (vice-presidents and above) at
the 1,500 largest American corporations. 28' Black women with pro-
fessional degrees who do attain top management positions earn 60%
of what white men in similar positions earn.282 Among physicians,
women earn less than 60% as much as men.83 A recent study re-
vealed that women graduates of the University of Michigan Law
School earned just 61% of what male graduates earned after fifteen
years of practice, and that after controlling for grades, career choice,
experience, work hours and family responsibilities, there remained an
unexplained gap of 13%. 284
Black employment remains concentrated in the least respected,
most undesirable job categories. Although blacks constitute 12% of
the population and 10% of the workforce, they fill over 30% of the
nursing aide and orderly jobs and almost 25% of the domestic servant
jobs, but only 3% of the jobs for lawyers and doctors.2 5 In 1993,
black and Hispanic men were only half as likely as white men to be
managers or professionals.M6 Similarly, women are disproportion-
ately steered into service jobs-although there are nearly as many wo-
men as men in the workforce, under 25% of all doctors and lawyers
277. Id. at 21.
278. Hearings on Affirmative Action in Employment: Hearings on H.R. 2128 Before the
Subcomm. on Employee-Employer Relations of the House Comm. on Economic and Edu-
cational Opportunities, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 268 (1995) (statement of Marcia D. Green-
berger, Co-President, Nat'l Women's Law Ctr.).
279. See ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMIN., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SER. P60, No.
184, MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES:
1992, at 150 tbl. 31 (1993).
280. FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMM'N, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE OF
THE NATION'S HUMAN CAPITAL 10-11 (1995).
281. AFFIRMAIVE ACrION REvIEw, supra note 4, at 23. The "glass ceiling" issue has
been a subject of particular interest to Asian-Americans, as well as women of all races. See
U.S. COMM'N ON CiviL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES FACING ASIAN AMERICANS IN THE
1990s, at 130 (1992).
282. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REvIEw, supra note 4, at 23.
283. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WOMEN WORKERS: TRENDS
AND ISSUES 35 (1993).
284. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REvIEw, supra note 4, at 25.
285. HACKER, supra note 260, at 111, 113.
286. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REvmw, supra note 4, at 24.
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are women.287 Women comprise over 90% of all dental hygienists,
but only 10.5% of the dentists.2
In the area of unemployment, the situation is getting worse, not
better, for blacks. During the 1970s the average unemployment rate
for blacks was twice as high as it was for whites.289 By 1990, the black
unemployment rate was 2.76 times higher than the white rate.29°
As dramatic as these differentials are, they give us only part of
the picture. Many unemployed workers are not counted by the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics because they have stopped actively looking
for work-if we count these "hidden unemployed," the first quarter
1992 black unemployment rate was 25.5 % 291 For black teenagers, the
official unemployment rate was 38%; adding the hidden unemployed
raised the true figure to almost 60%.292 Moreover, unemployed
blacks took longer to find new jobs than unemployed whites, and were
only half as likely to qualify for unemployment insurance.293
Some have theorized that factors other than race explain the em-
ployment and income disparities between blacks and whites. A recent
study tested the theories that black income is lower than white income
because of education, employment status, age, sex, social class, marital
status, community (city or suburb), and region.294 The author found
that although each of these factors helped to explain the race gap in
income, when all were factored in, a gap remained that was particu-
larly large for middle-class, well educated black men employed as pro-
fessionals, whom the author concluded were "a 'truly disadvantaged'
group when compared to middle-class whites.12 95
During periods of economic growth, one might expect those
groups who are less represented in the workforce to make greater
gains. But in the long business cycle upswings of the 1970s and 1980s,
the relative position of black workers grew worse, not better.296 How-
287. ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMIN., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1994, AT 407-409 (1994) [hereinafter STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT].
288. Id.
289. HACKER, supra note 260, at 103.
290. Al.
291. NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, PERILS OF NEGLECT-. BLACK UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE
NINETIES 1 (1992).
292. Id at 2.
293. Id.
294. Melvin E. Thomas, Race, Class, and Personal Income: An Empirical Test of the
Declining Significance of Race Thesis, 1978-1988, 40 Soc. PROBS. 328 (1993).
295. Id. at 339-40.
296. See M.V. Lee Badgett, Rising Black Unemployment: Changes in Job Stability or in
Employability?, 22 REv. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 55, 55 (1994).
ever, when recession and downsizing affect the economy, blacks are
likely to bear a disproportionate share of the burden. For example, in
the 1990-91 recession, black Americans suffered a net job loss, while
whites, Hispanic and Asian Americans gained thousands of jobs.2 97
At Dial Corporation, for example, blacks lost 43.6% of the jobs cut,
although they represented only 26.3% of Dial's work force entering
the recession. 298 At W.R. Grace, black workers held 13.1% of the
company's pre-recession jobs but suffered 32.2% of the lay-offs.299 At
BankAmerica and FIT, blacks lost jobs at more than twice the rate of
their participation in the workforce.300
Employment discrimination against individual women and minor-
ity group members is pervasive. In 1994 alone, over 150,000 com-
plaints of employment discrimination were filed with federal, state
and local government.301 By comparison, employment discrimination
against white men is remarkably rare. A recent study conducted for
the Department of Labor by Professor Alfred Blumrosen of Rutgers
Law School surveyed every federal court employment discrimination
case reported in the national reporters between 1990 and 1994, a total
of over three thousand cases.302 Blumrosen found that fewer than one
hundred of these cases involved claims of race or sex discrimination
by white men.3 3 He analyzed twenty-one of the cases in depth; in
only six was there a finding of liability.3 4 Blumrosen also examined
the impact of challenges to affirmative action employment programs.
In twelve cases, the affirmative action program was upheld, while in
six it was held to be improper. 0 5 It is difficult not to conclude from
this survey that the extent of discrimination against white men is ex-
tremely limited.
By contrast, a series of audits conducted over the past few years
demonstrates a high degree of employment discrimination against mi-
norities when matched auditor-applicants apply for jobs.306 A number
of experiments conducted by the Urban Institute establishes that dis-
297. Rochelle Sharpe, Losing Ground: In Latest Recession, Only Blacks Suffered Net




301. AFFIRMATIVE ACTiON REVIEW, supra note 4, at 21.
302. Reverse Discrimination Complaints Rare, Labor Study Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.




306. I initially reported on these audits in an earlier article. See supra note 139.
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crimination against blacks and Hispanics is pervasive. 30 7 These stud-
ies, carried out in San Diego, Chicago and Washington, D.C., paired
college-aged men with identical simulated job qualifications and di-
rected them to seek employment, following a carefully scripted plan,
from the same firms. In one of the experiments, white and black job
seekers applied for entry level jobs advertised in newspapers in Wash-
ington, D.C., and Chicago during the summer of 1990. A total of 476
tests, termed "audits," were conducted. In our nation's capital, the
white auditors were more than three times as likely to receive job of-
fers as were the black auditors.30 8 In Chicago, the white auditors were
twice as likely to receive a job offer.309 In the Chicago and San Diego
tests comparing white and Hispanic auditors, the white applicants
were more than 50% more likely to be offered jobs than were the
Hispanic applicants.310
Although the Urban Institute auditors were instructed to push
forward with their applications unless or until they were either offered
or denied the job, many real-life job-seekers will likely be discouraged
from pursuing an employment application because of their treatment
in the hiring process. It is thus significant that in those 45% of the
D.C. audits where both auditors received interviews, the white audi-
tors were almost twice as likely as the black auditors to be favored in
terms of waiting time, length of interview, number of interviewers,
positive comments and negative comments.311 For example, "a black
auditor reported that he had received a very discouraging impression
of the job, including the statement that 'your supervisor will work
your butt off.' The white partner, on the other hand, was told that the
company offered great opportunities for advancement. 3 1 2 The dis-
criminatory results were not uniform across all job categories. In gen-
eral, blacks were more likely to encounter unfavorable treatment in
higher paying, higher status jobs and in jobs involving substantial cus-
tomer contact.313
307. MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., URBAN INST. REPORT 91-9, OPPORTUNITIES DE-
NIED, OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING (1991); HARRY
CROSS ET AL., URBAN INST. REPORT 90-4, EMPLOYER HIRING PRAcTIcES: DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT OF HISPANIC AND ANGLO JOB SEEKERS (1990).
308. TURNER ET AL., supra note 307, at 41 tbl. 4.4.
309. Id
310. CRoSS Er AL., supra note 307, at 41 tbl. 5.1.
311. TURNER ET AL., supra note 307, at 45-48 tbl. 4.7.
312. Id. at 48-49.
313. Id. at 52-53.
Another series of audits was conducted between 1990 and 1992
by the Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc.314 "The
tests revealed that blacks were treated significantly worse than equally
qualified whites 24% of the time and Latinos were treated worse than
whites 22% of the time."31 For example, when two pairs of testers
appeared at a nationally-franchised employment agency, the black
testers were given no referrals while the white testers were immedi-
ately referred to jobs.316 A black woman applied to a major hotel
chain and received no call-back, while her white counterpart was of-
fered a desk clerk job.31 7 When two equally qualified women applied
for a typist/receptionist job, the black woman received no offer while
the white woman was offered a better, higher paying job than the one
advertised. 18 Where black testers were offered jobs, the conditions
were often materially different. One pair of auditors applied at a car
dealership for sales jobs; the white applicant was interviewed for the
sales position, but the black applicant was told he would have to begin
by washing cars.319
Another audit, focusing on discrimination against Hispanics,
found that Hispanic job auditors received 25% fewer job interviews
and 34% fewer offers than did white testers.320 An audit focusing on
sex discrimination found that in high-priced restaurants "men were
more than twice as likely to receive an interview and five times as
likely to receive a job offer than the women testers."32'
A recent study that combined and re-examined the results of
these six controlled experiments determined that when a white job
applicant was interviewed, he or she had a 46.9% likelihood of being
offered the job; for a similarly qualified black applicant, the likelihood
of a job offer was 11.3%.322 In other words, the white applicant was
over four times more likely to get the job than the equally qualified
black applicant. In 16.7% of the cases where both applicants were
offered the job, the white applicant was offered a higher starting sal-
ary, while the reverse never occurred. 3 Where both applicants were
314. See AFFIRMATr-E ACrzON REVIEw, supra note 4, at 21.
315. Id.
316, ht
317, let at 21-22.




322. Marc Bendick, Jr., et al., Measuring Employment Discrimination Through Con-
trolled Experiments, 23 REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 25, 31 (1994).
323. Id. at 32.
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offered a job, the average starting salary was $5.45 per hour, but
where only the white applicant was offered the job, the starting pay
was $7.13 per hour.324
Nonetheless, a majority (58%) of white respondents to the Bro-
die study believes that on the subject of jobs the average black Ameri-
can is as well off as the average white American, and 45% believe the
same of Hispanic Americans.325 On the risk of losing their job, 70%
of the whites surveyed believe that the average black American is as
well off or better off than the average white American, and 53% be-
lieve the same of Hispanic Americans.326
As American women find the glass ceiling impenetrable, their
satisfaction with work and optimism about the future decline. In the
1990 Virginia Slims poll, 37% of the women reported great personal
satisfaction from their work, and 73% saw the role of women in the
workplace as changing for the better.327 By 1995, only 31% were find-
ing great personal satisfaction in their work, and only 56% saw the
role of women in the workplace as changing for the better.328 By con-
trast, men reported greater personal satisfaction in their work in 1995
(40%) than they had in 1990 (35%).329
A recent study conducted at the University of Chicago demon-
strates both how and why racism accounts for at least part of the dis-
parity in employment opportunities between blacks and whites in
urban jobs. 33° The authors concluded that inner-city employers com-
monly direct their recruitment efforts toward white neighborhoods,
and avoid recruiting from sources likely to attract large numbers of
black applicants.331 For example, downtown businesses would fre-
quently advertise only in suburban or white ethnic newspapers, rather
than in metropolitan newspapers.332 This avoidance of black appli-
cants was tied to strongly held stereotypes about black workers.
Among the representative sampling of Chicago employers surveyed,
32.8% of the employment decision-makers stated they believed blacks
were not dependable, 37.8% said blacks had "bad attitudes," 47.2%
324. ld. at 35.
325. BRODIE, supra note 217, at 81-84.
326. Id




330. Katheryn M. Neckerman & Joleen Kirschenman, Hiring Strategies, Racial Bias,
and Inner-City Workers, 38 Soc. PRoBs. 433 (1991).
331. Id. at 434, 437-39.
332. Id. at 438.
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complained that blacks lack a "work ethic," and 50.4% responded that
blacks lack "basic skills., 333
When employers use these kinds of stereotypes in making em-
ployment decisions they violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.33 4 But employers rarely admit they are making decisions based
on stereotypes, and they may not even recognize they are doing so.
Although we can conclude from these studies that white employers
engage in massive amounts of discrimination against minority appli-
cants and employees, we can also conclude that identifying the indi-
vidual victims of particular acts of discrimination will usually be
impossible. It is precisely for this reason that class-based affirmative
action remedies are necessary.
D. Housing
In their landmark study of racial segregation in America, Ameri-
can Apartheid, sociologists Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton
carefully chronicle the history, causes and impact of residential racial
segregation in America.335 Their findings demonstrate that
[n]o group in the history of the United States has ever exper-
ienced the sustained high level of residential segregation that
has been imposed on blacks in large American cities for the past
fifty years. This extreme isolation did not just happen; it was
manufactured by whites through a series of self-conscious ac-
tions and purposeful institutional arrangements that continue
today. Not only is the depth of black segregation unprece-
dented and utterly unique compared with that of other groups,
but it shows little sign of change with the passage of time or
improvements in socioeconomic status. If policy makers, schol-
ars, and the public have been reluctant to acknowledge segrega-
tion's persistence, they have likewise been blind to its
consequences for black Americans. Residential segregation is
not a neutral fact; it systematically undermines the social and
economic well-being of blacks in the United States.... The ef-
fect of segregation on black well-being is structural, not individ-
ual. Residential segregation lies beyond the ability of any
individual to change; it constrains black life chances irrespective
of personal traits, individual motivations, or private
achievements.336
333. lId at 440 tbl. 2.
334. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that the use of sex-
based stereotypes in reaching employment decision violates Title VII).
335. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID (1993).
336. lId at 2-3.
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In the period between emancipation and the dramatic increase in
migration to the North brought on by the industrial revolution, most
urban blacks lived in largely white neighborhoods.3 37 In 1890, fewer
than 7% of Northern urban blacks lived in predominantly black
neighborhoods.338 But between 1890 and 1940, racial zoning ordi-
nances enacted by local governments, 339 periodic waves of violence
directed at blacks living in white neighborhoods, block busting and
steering by real estate agents,340 and restrictive covenants by real es-
tate developers and "neighborhood improvement" associations
pushed many more blacks into predominantly black ghettos.3 4 1 By
1940, 32% of urban blacks lived in ghettos.3 2
World War II brought many black migrants from rural sharecrop-
ping to industrial cities. At war's end, a massive suburban housing
boom permitted wide-scale white flight from urban centers to outlying
neighborhoods. The investment in the suburbs was largely the result
of FHA and VA policies. These policies favored lending money for
new home construction, while disfavoring loans for rehabilitation, and
denied loans to residents of neighborhoods threatened with "instabil-
ity" because of their "inharmonious racial or nationality groups."'1 3
Between 1946 and 1960, federal subsidized loans financed the building
of over 350,000 new homes in Northern California; fewer than 100
went to blacks.3" During this same period, vast "urban renewal"
projects concentrated urban blacks in racially segregated massive pub-
lic housing projects 4-' Private banks and insurance companies exac-
erbated the problem by engaging in widespread red-lining of minority
neighborhoods.346
These policies reflected widespread white support for segrega-
tion. In a 1942 poll, 84% of white Americans agreed that blacks
should live in separate sections of towns and cities. 7 In a 1962 poll,
337. Id. at 17, 21 tbl. 2.1.
338. Id. at 24 tbl. 2.2.
339. See ARLENE ZAREMBKA, THE URBAN HOUSING CRISES: SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND
LEGAL ISSUES AND PROPOSALS 101 (1990).
340. Id. at 106-107; see also JOHN YINGER, DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOP-
MENT, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION STUDY: INCIDENCE OF DISCRIMINATION AND VARIA-
TION IN DISCRIMINATORY BEHAVIOR iX (1991).
341. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 335, at 19-42.
342. Id. at 48 tbl. 2.4.
343. Id. at 54.
344. Affirmative Actions, Oct. 1995, at 2.
345. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 335, at 49-57.
346. See generally Peter Dreier, Redlining Cities: How Banks Color Community Devel-
opment, CHALLENGE, Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 15.
347. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 335, at 49.
61% of white Americans agreed that whites had a right to keep blacks
out of their neighborhoods.?4 As a result, by 1970 the isolation of
most blacks in black ghettos was complete; close to 75% of black
Americans living in metropolitan regions lived in predominantly seg-
regated neighborhoods.' 49
Despite the passage of the 1968 Fair Housing Act,350 segregation
has not abated. Massey and Denton document the persistence of seg-
regation in the 1970s, along with the emergence of "hypersegrega-
tion. ' '351  Hypersegregation exists when: (1) there is a high
concentration of segregation, so that the distribution of blacks and
whites in a community is highly uneven; (2) blacks are highly isolated
from living near whites; (3) black neighborhoods are heavily clustered,
reducing chance encounters between blacks and whites; (4) blacks are
spatially distributed close to the central business district, where they
are more likely to be exposed to high crime rates, social disorder, and
economic marginality; and (5) the population density of the ghetto is
significantly higher than that of white neighborhoods.3 2 "People
growing up in such an environment have little direct experience with
the culture, norms, and behaviors of the rest of American society and
few social contacts with members of other racial groups. 353 Massey
and Denton found that sixteen metropolitan areas, which housed over
one third of the black population of the United States, were hyper-
segregated in 1980.354
Although hypersegregation is closely associated with poverty,
even middle-class blacks are largely excluded from white neighbor-
hoods. Massey and Denton found the segregation of very low-income
blacks (those earning under $2,500 per year) was virtually identical to
the segregation of upper-income blacks (those earning over $50,000
per year).35 5 In the twenty Northern metropolitan areas with the larg-
est black populations, the average index of segregation of very low-
income blacks was 85.8%; the average index for upper-income blacks
was 83.2%.356 Massey and Denton explain this by examining the re-
348. Id.
349. It at 48 tbl. 2.4.
350. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1995).
351. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 335, at 60-78.
352. Id. at 74-75.
353. It. at 77.
354. Id. at 75-76.
355. Id. at 84-88.
356. I& at 86 tbl. 4.1.
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luctance of whites to live in neighborhoods in which there are black
residents:
Demand is strong for homes in all-white areas, but once one or
two black families enter a neighborhood, white demand begins
to falter as some white families leave and others refuse to move
in. The acceleration in residential turnover coincides with the
expansion of black demand, making it very likely that outgoing
white households will be replaced disproportionately with black
families. As the black percentage goes up, white demand drops
ever more steeply as black demand rises at an increasing rate.
By the time black demand peaks at the 50% mark, practically no
whites are willing to enter and the majority (64%) are trying to
leave.357
As of 1990, whites were over 50% more likely to own or be buy-
ing their own homes than blacks358 or Hispanics.359 A black-owned
home had a median value of $50,700, compared with $80,200 for a
white-owned home.3 6° Further, blacks were more than three times as
likely as whites to live in housing defined by the Census Bureau as
"crowded,"'361 while Hispanics were ten times as likely as non-His-
panic whites to live in crowded housing. 62
A 1988 study by the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) attempted to measure the extent to
which racial discrimination infects the housing market.363 The study
tested the practices of real estate agents in twenty major metropolitan
areas, by sending out teams of black and white auditors to seek hous-
ing, and compared their experiences. The study revealed that when
housing availability and financial assistance were considered together,
the likelihood that a black homeseeker would experience discrimina-
tion by real estate agents was over 50%. When the steering of black
homeseekers into black neighborhoods and white homeseekers into
white neighborhoods was added, the likelihood of discrimination in
the sales market was increased to greater than 60%. The likelihood of
experiencing discrimination in at least one of three visits was greater
357. Id. at 96.
358. See ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMIN., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, WE THE
AMERICAN .. . BLACKS 9 (1993) (hereinafter WE THE AMERICAN BLACKS).
359. See ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMIN., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
BRIEF No. 95-4, HOUSING IN METROPOLITAN AREAS-HISPANIC ORIGIN HOUSEHOLDS 1
(1995) (hereinafter HISPANIC ORIGIN HOUSEHOLDS).
360. WE THE AMERICAN BLACKS, supra note 358, at 9.
361. See ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMIN., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
BRIEF No. 95-5, HOUSING IN METROPOLITAN AREAS-BLACK HOUSEHOLDS 2 (1995).
362. See HISPANIC ORIGIN HOUSEHOLDS, supra note 359, at 2.
363. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 335, at 101-102.
than 90%.364 Where additional unadvertised units were available, the
probability that they would be shown to whites but not blacks was
91%.365
A 1992 HUD report details the degree to which private lenders
continue to discriminate against black home-buyers. H-UD concluded
that blacks are two-thirds more likely than whites to have their credit
applications rejected. Even after correcting for loan-to-value ratios,
debt burdens, and credit histories, blacks were still 60% more likely to
be rejected for home mortgages. 66
As cities have become poorer, the dual problems of inadequate
housing and homelessness have dramatically increased across
America. Not surprisingly, the burden falls disproportionately on
non-whites. In New York City, Hispanics are three times as likely as
whites to live in inadequate housing, and blacks are two and a half
times as likely.367
The economic/political consequences of housing discrimination
and post-war white flight leading to hypersegregation have been enor-
mous for blacks. Segregation in the pre-war period occurred mostly
within municipal lines. Thus, whites had local revenue responsibilities
for poor blacks living in the same city, if not the same neighborhood.
Municipal racial isolation grew after the war, however, as whites fled
cities. As a result, not only did residential segregation grow, but
whites had less responsibility to aid poor blacks through local
government. 68
In sum, blacks and Hispanics experience wide-spread discrimina-
tion in seeking housing to purchase or rent, and in seeking mortgages.
The housing they do find is crowded, physically inadequate, racially
segregated, and isolated from good transportation and employment
opportunities. When they move into better housing in white neigh-
borhoods, whites flee. As a result, segregated minority neighbor-
hoods, which often have greater social needs, have a smaller tax base
and can offer fewer public services than comparable white communi-
364. Id at 102-03.
365. Id. at 104.
366. JAMES H. CARR AND IsAAc F. MEGBOLUGBE, OFFICE OF HOUSING RESEARCH,
PROCEEDINGs-HMDA DATA AND MORTGAGE MARKET DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH
(1992).
367. PHILIP WEITZMAN, COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF N.Y., WORLDS APART.
HOUSING, RAcE/ETHNICITY, AND INCOME IN NEW YORK CrrY, 1978-1987, at vii, x (1989).
368. Douglas S. Massey, Getting Away With Murder: Segregation and Violent Crime in
Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1228-1229 (1995) (citing forthcoming report by
Massey & Zoltan L. Hajnal).
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ties. Unless employers, schools and governments reach out to these
neighborhoods through affirmative action programs, the isolation will
only grow worse.
E. Health Care
One of the flashpoints of affirmative action is the selection of stu-
dents for medical school. Medical school admissions are highly com-
petitive, and schools ultimately admit few minority students.
Although blacks constitute 12% and Hispanics constitute 9% of the
national population, they constitute less than 4%369 and 2% respec-
tively of the nation's doctors.37 ° Thus, it bears asking whether the
dearth of minority doctors affects the health of minority communities.
For Dr. Benjamin Chavis, the U.C. Davis Medical School gradu-
ate identified as the black student admitted instead of Alan Bakke,
the answer is easy. In an article by Nicholas Lemann,
[h]e ticks off what the black doctors admitted under Davis's spe-
cial minorities-only program (which was eliminated after the
Supreme Court's Bakke decision, resulting in subsequent classes
having only one or two black members) are doing now: almost
all are in primary care in underserved areas, including his ex-
wife, Toni Johnson Chavis, a pediatrician in Compton. If Chavis
hadn't gotten into medical school, his patients wouldn't be
treated by some better-qualified white obstetrician; they'd have
no doctor at all and their babies would be delivered the way
Chavis was-by whoever happened to be on duty at the emer-
gency room of the county hospital.371
There is substantial evidence in support of Dr. Chavis' belief. As
of 1994, the infant death rate for blacks was over 2.4 times higher than
the rate for whites.372 Among black children in East Harlem, it was
even higher.37 3 As Senator Bill Bradley stated, "a child's chance of
surviving to age five are better in Bangladesh than in East Harlem. 374
Further, though overall mortality rates have been dropping in the
United States, this improvement has not been shared equally. While
the death rate for whites dropped dramatically between 1960 and
369. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 290, at 393, 407-10.
370. See Tom Philp, UC Davis Race Case Mirrors Past Suit, SACRAMENTo BEE, Aug. 13,
1995, at Al.
371. Nicholas Lamann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. TIMwES, Jun. 11, 1995, § 6
(Magazine), at 36, 66.
372. NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. INFANT AND GENERAL MORTAL-
ITY: RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC DISPARITIES (1995).
373. KoZOL, supra note 227, at 115-16.
374. Id.
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1986, the death rate for blacks has not decreased as much.375 As a
result, the black death rate in 1993 for ages 35-45 was 51.83 per 10,000,
while the white death rate was 19.98 per 10,000.376 Among white men
aged 35-45, the death rate was 28.22 per 10,000; among black men it
was well over twice as high, at 73.24 per 10,000. 3 7 7 For women aged
35-45, the black death rate of 27.00 per 10,000 was nearly twice as high
as the white death rate of 14.35 per 10,000.378 The average life expec-
tancy for white men in 1993 was 8.3 years longer than for black
men.379 The gap has grown since 1970, when it was 8.0 years.380 The
average life expectancy in 1993 for white women was 5.8 years longer
than for black women.381
Even when corrected for education and income, the black death
rate remains considerably higher than the white death rate. For exam-
ple, among men between the ages of 25 and 64 who had completed 4
or more years of college, the white death rate in 1986 was 28 per
10,000; the black rate was 60 per 10,000. 382 For women in the same
category, the white rate was 18 per 10,000; the black rate was 22 per
10,000.383 For white men between 25 and 64 earning over $25,000 per
year in 1986 the death rate was 24 per 10,000; for black men at the
same income level it was 36 per 10,000.384 For women in this age and
income category, the white death rate was 16 per 10,000; the black
rate was 23 per 10,000.385
Although white women have a greater chance of getting breast
cancer, black women are much more likely to die from it.386 Similarly,
blacks and whites suffer equally from depression, but blacks are less
375. See generally Gregory Pappas et al., The Increasing Disparity in Mortality Between
Socioeconomic Groups in the United States, 1960 and 1986, 329 NEw ENG. J. MaD. 103
(1993).




379. Id at 17 tbl. 7 (73.0 years for white men, 64.7 years for black men).
380. Id (68.0 years for white men, 60.0 years for black men).
381. I11 (79.5 years for white women, 73.7 years for black women). The gap narrowed
from the 7.3 year gap in 1970. Id




386. Gina Kolata, Deadliness of Breast Cancer in Blacks Defies Easy Answer, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 3, 1994, at CIO.
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likely to receive treatment because of diagnostic errors.3  Although
blacks make up just 12% of the national population, their children
constitute 46% of the children suffering from lead poisoning.388
Severe uncontrolled hypertension occurs considerably more often
among blacks and Hispanics than among whites. 389 One effect is that
blacks have an almost four times greater chance to suffer from hyper-
tension-induced end-stage renal disease (ESRD).390 Blacks wait al-
most twice as long (3.9 months compared to 7.6 months for whites) for
their first kidney transplant, the preferred treatment for ESRD.391
While the precise cause of these differences cannot always be de-
termined, the effect is evident: blacks and Hispanics need more health
care and get less. For example, a 1993 report in The New England
Journal of Medicine documented that black victims were over three
times more likely to die from their heart attacks.392 Poor children,
who are disproportionately black and Hispanic, are far less likely to
receive basic childhood vaccinations than non-poor children.393
Asthma deaths in Harlem and the South Bronx are eight times higher
than the national average.394 The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention have calculated that, overall, blacks are five times as likely
as whites to die of asthma.395
One link between poverty and disease may be hunger. A recent
study on childhood hunger in the United States reported that children
suffering from hunger are four times more likely to suffer from fatigue
and inability to concentrate, more than twice as likely to suffer from
anemia, and more than 50% more likely to suffer from frequent colds
387. See generally Harold W. Neighbors et al., The Influence of Racial Factors on Psy-
chiatric Diagnosis: A Review and Suggestions for Research, 25 COMMUNITY MENTAL
HEALTH J. 301 (1989).
388. SARAH E. ROYCE, LEAD Toxicrry: CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE
(1992).
389. Steven Shea et al., Predisposing Factors For Severe, Uncontrolled Hypertension in
an Inner-City Minority Population, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 776, 779 (1992).
390. Ian Ayres et al., Unequal Racial Access to Kidney Transplantation, 46 VAND. L.
REv. 805, 810 (1993).
391. Id. at 807.
392. Lance B. Becker et al., Racial Differences in the Incidence of Cardiac Arrest and
Subsequent Survival, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 600, 601 (1993).
393. National Center for Health Statistics, Press Release, Annual Report on Nation's
Health Shows Continued Disparities, June 22, 1995.
394. Adam Nossiter, Asthma Common and on Rise in the Crowded South Bronx, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 1995, at Al.
395. 40% Rise in Asthma and Asthma Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1995, § 1, at 10.
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than other children. 396 Hunger strikes far more black and Hispanic
children than their portion of the population.397
Another likely cause of the difference in medical care received by
minority group members is their relative lack of medical insurance. In
1993, 14.2% of the white population lacked medical insurance (includ-
ing private, group and government insurance), compared to 20.5% of
the black population and 31.6% of the Hispanic population.398 An-
other factor may be the role that employment discrimination plays in
causing health problems. Recent studies of black and Hispanic wo-
men have linked discrimination in the workplace with high levels of
physical and psychological ill health.399
Even when insurance availability is equalized, dramatic differ-
ences in medical treatment remain. A 1994 survey of studies of Medi-
care beneficiaries disclosed that black patients were far less likely than
white patients to receive certain important heart and vascular proce-
dures, and certain other surgical procedures (reduction of fractures of
the femur, other arthroplasty of the hip, total knee replacement, total
hip replacement, laminectomy, excision of disc, and spinal fusion).4 0°
Where black patients did receive these procedures, they suffered a
higher mortality rate, suggesting that doctors did not refer them for
the procedures until they were more seriously ill than their white
counterparts.40 ' In a few areas, such as amputations of the lower limb,
blacks received more procedures than would have been expected.40 2
The authors concluded that:
[b]lack persons may be more likely to receive procedures that
reflect delayed diagnosis or initial treatment (palliative or ad-
vanced-stage cancer treatment), poor or infrequent medical care
(diabetes and vascular disease progressing to amputations and
skin necrosis/infection), or severe illness for which management
of diabetes or hypertension has failed (ESRD). It is generally
396. COMMUNITY CHILDHOOD HUNGER IDENTIFICATION PROJECT, A SURVEY OF
CHILDHOOD HUNGER IN THE UNITED STATES 22 tbl. 2.4 (1995).
397. Id. at 14 tbl. 2.1.
398. ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMIN., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
BRIEF No. 94-28, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE-1993, at 2 (1994).
399. David R. Williams et al., The Concept of Race and Health Status in America, 108
PUB. HEALTH REP. 26, 30 (1994).
400. A. Marshall McBean & Marian Gornick, Differences by Race in the Rates of Proce-
dures Performed in Hospitals for Medicare Beneficiaries, 15 HEALTH CARE FINANCING
REV. 77, 81-82 tbls. 2 & 3 (1994).
401. Id. at 85.
402. Id. at 84 tbl. 5.
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believed that these four procedures may often be avoided or
delayed by comprehensive and continuous medical care.403
In some cases, studies demonstrate that racial differences in med-
ical care can be directly attributed to racism. Two 1993 reports on the
treatment of heart disease are particularly telling.4 °4 The Ayanian
study examined a nationwide sample of over 27,000 Medicare patients
who underwent coronary angiography in 1987. (Angiography is a di-
agnostic procedure used among people with symptoms of heart dis-
ease to determine whether they need to have their arteries cleared -
"revascularized" 
- either through angioplasty or coronary artery by-
pass surgery.) Prior to the study, it had already been well established
that blacks with coronary heart disease are less likely to receive angi-
ography than are whites.40 5 It was therefore theorized that among
those who overcame the barriers necessary to enter treatment by a
cardiologist and have the angiography performed, an equal or greater
number would be found to need revascularization.40 6 Instead, the
study found that whites were 78% more likely to receive a revascu-
larization procedure within 90 days of their angiography than were
blacks.407
The racial disparity found in the Ayanian study was unaffected by
diagnosis; regression analysis established that among Medicare pa-
tients confirmed to have serious heart disease who would benefit from
angioplasty or bypass surgery, whites were significantly more likely to
receive treatment as were blacks.408 In attempting to determine the
cause of this disparity, the authors of the Ayanian study found that
"[p]hysicians were less likely to recommend CABG [bypass] surgery
to blacks than whites, despite equivalent numbers of diseased arteries
and more severe angina among blacks, suggesting physicians were
more aggressive in their therapeutic approach for white patients. 40 9
The Ayanian study left open the possibility that economic factors,
such as availability of supplemental insurance, affected the results.
The Whittle study helped address that question. It also examined the
racial disparities in revascularization procedures by examining the
403. Id. at 88.
404. John Z. Ayanian et al., Racial Differences in the Use of Revascularization Proce-
dures After Coronary Angiography, 269 JAMA 2642 (1993); Jeff Whittle et al., Racial Dif-
ferences in the Use of Invasive Cardiovascular Procedures in the Department of Veterans
Affairs Medical System, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 621 (1993).
405. Id.
406. Id. at 2642-43.
407. ld. at 2642.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 2645.
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treatment of 822,930 heart disease patients at United States Veterans
Affairs [VA] hospitals between 1987 and 1991.410 By using VA pa-
tients, who all receive free medical care, the study eliminated any con-
sideration of ability to pay.4 1 ' It also eliminated any incentive among
the physicians to recommend unnecessary treatment, as VA physicians
are usually salaried.412 In every diagnostic category, whites under-
went the procedures more frequently than did blacks. Overall, whites
were 50% more likely than blacks to undergo angioplasty, and 122%
more likely to undergo coronary bypass surgery. 1 The evident con-
clusion is that physicians, the vast majority of whom are white, take
better care of white patients than black patients, even when there are
no economic factors at stake.
Another test comparing treatment of white and black patients fo-
cused on the likelihood that a physician would breach patient confi-
dentiality and report a patient's HIV-positive status to public health
officials. 414 The authors posed a series of hypothetical problems to
white physicians, and thereafter corrected for all factors other than
race.415 They determined that when all other factors were held con-
stant, white doctors were over ten times more likely to breach the
confidentiality of black patients than white patients.416
Although minority group members have substantially less access
to health care, whites perceive the opposite. In a recent survey, 64%
of white respondents stated that access to health care for blacks is just
as good or better than it is for whites.417 Only 30% responded that
access for blacks is worse than access for whites.418 Similarly, 51%
believe that access to health care is better for Hispanic than for white
Americans, while 42% believe it is worse.4 19
Women also appear to suffer from sex bias by male doctors in
certain research and treatment areas. For example, although cardio-
410. Whittle et al., supra note 404, at 621-22. The study also examined how frequently
patients with heart disease were diagnosed through angiography. It found that whites were
38% more likely to receive the procedure than were blacks. Id at 623, 625 tbl. 3.
411. Id. at 621.
412. Id.
413. Id
414. Judith A. Schwartzbaum et al., Physician Breach of Patient Confidentiality Among
Individuals with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Infection: Patterns of Decision, 80
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 829 (1990).
415. Id. at 829-30.
416. Id. at 831-32 & tbl. 5.
417. BRODIE, supra note 217, at 81-82.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 83-84.
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vascular disease is the leading cause of death among women, "women
have been enrolled in limited numbers or excluded entirely from
many of the major research trials on which the treatment of cardiovas-
cular disease have been based."420 Recent studies suggest that women
heart attack patients are less likely to receive coronary revasculariza-
tion and are less likely to receive pharmacological treatment than
male heart attack patients.421
In sum, our health care system does a far better job in treating
white male patients than in treating other patients. Although part of
the reason for the difference is undoubtedly poverty and lack of insur-
ance, another part is clearly discrimination by white doctors. Integrat-
ing the profession with more black and other minority physicians and
other medical workers is a necessary prerequisite to equal medical
care for minority group members. Similarly, the male bias of the med-
ical profession is harmful to women patients. When it is gender-inte-
grated, it will serve the needs of women more fairly. Because
affirmative action substantially assists minorities and women in ob-
taining positions in the medical profession, it is an important tool in
equalizing medical treatment throughout the United States.
F. Economic Opportunity
Another barrier experienced by minorities and women is discrim-
ination in economic opportunities. Andrew Young believes that dis-
crimination in access to capital is the greatest current impediment to
black participation in the economy.4' As of 1990, blacks owned only
2.4% of the businesses in the United States, and 85% of those busi-
nesses were sole proprietorships with no employees.423
When minority and women-owned businesses cannot borrow
money, they cannot compete. And when they are shut out of con-
tracts by white male-owned businesses, they have no opportunity to
prove themselves. For example, after a study conducted by the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Chicago in 1992 disclosed broad evidence that
banks approved fewer loans to blacks and Hispanics than to whites, a
new study was commissioned in response to intense criticism by bank-
420. Frederick E. Kuhn & Charles E. Rackley, Coronary Artery Disease in Women:
Risk Factors, Treatment, and Prevention, 153 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 2626, 2626 (1993).
421. See generally Mikael Dellborg & Karl Swedberg, Acute Myocardial Infarction: Dif-
ference in the Treatment Between Men and Women, 5 QUALITY ASSURANCE HEALTH CARE
261 (1993).
422. Telephone interview with Andrew Young (Apr. 5, 1994).
423. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REVIEW, supra note 4, at 24.
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ing leaders.424 In the second study, the Fed again found convincing
evidence of race discrimination.425 The new study established that
among loan applicants with bad credit ratings, disapproval rates were
twice as high for black and Hispanic applicants as they were for white
applicants.426 The study research director attributed the difference in
treatment to possible unconscious racial bias by white loan officers.4 27
Rather than acknowledge that racism affects banking decisions, the
chief economist of the American Bankers' Association attacked the
study as part of a "'continuing saga of trying to beat up the banking
industry. ' '' 4
2
The banking industry responded to the first report by lobbying
heavily against requiring banks to compile data on the race and gen-
der of their small business loan customers.42 9 If such data is not col-
lected, studies like the Chicago Fed study will be more difficult, if not
impossible to complete. A survey based on interviews with major
bank CEOs estimates that less than .5% of small business loans are
made to minority businesses.43 ° In April of 1995, under intense pres-
sure from bankers and Republicans in Congress, the Federal Reserve
Bank, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision announced
that they would drop their proposal to require reporting and collec-
tion of such data, although it would be encouraged on a voluntary
basis.431
Discrimination in contract bidding is another economic barrier.
In a post-Croson study conducted by Kings County, Washington, doz-
ens of women and minority construction contractors testified about
their exclusion from private and government work, claiming that
although their prices were competitive and their work quality high,
they were continually rejected from contract work unless an affirma-
tive action plan required minority participation.432 The owner of a
minority-owned engineering company reported hearing comments
424. See Keith Bradsher, A Second Fed Bank Study Finds Disparities in Mortgage Lend-






430. Telephone interview Robert Gnaizda, General Counsel, The Greenlining Coali-
tion (July 19, 1995).
431. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., U.S. Regulators Drop A Proposal Aimed at Bias in Banks'
Lending, N.Y. TIMus, Apr. 19, 1995, at Al.
432. See Coral Constr. Co. v. Kings County, 941 F.2d 910, 917-918 (9th Cir. 1991).
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like, "'[t]here is no minority requirement on this project, so we are
going to use someone else."'433
A similar study in San Francisco found that
available MBEs [minority business enterprises] received far
fewer city contracts in proportion to their numbers than their
available non-minority counterparts.... For example, in prime
contracting for construction, although MBE availability was
49.5%, MIBE dollar participation was only 11.1%; in prime con-
tracting for equipment and supplies, although MBE availability
was 36%, MBE dollar participation was only 17%; and in prime
contracting for general services, MBE availability was 49%
although MBE dollar participation was only 6.2%. 4 4
The statistical findings were supplemented by
numerous reports of MBEs being denied contracts despite being
the low bidder, MBEs being told they were not qualified
although they were later found qualified when evaluated by
outside parties, MBEs being refused work even after they were
awarded the contracts as low bidder, and MBEs being harassed
by City personnel to discourage them from bidding on city
contracts. 35
In Los Angeles, out of every dollar spent on construction by the
county government in 1994, ninety-five cents went to white-owned
construction firms, while Hispanic firms received about four cents and
black contractors received less than a penny.436
An in-depth study conducted in 1990 by Feagin and Imani ex-
amined the construction industry in a major Southern metropolitan
area.437 In examining the experience of 76 minority contractors, they
found race discrimination across the industry.438 Construction unions
exclude blacks from union membership and allocate jobs unfairly to
black members.439 White contractors exclude black contractors from
private jobs, make late bid requests on public jobs in order to techni-
cally satisfy affirmative action requirements while making actual bid-
ding by black contractors impossible, and engage in bid shopping and
bid switching to help white friends." When blacks get contracts, em-
433. Id. at 918.
434. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Coalition for Economic Equity, 950 F.2d 1401,
1414 (9th Cir. 1991).
435. Id. at 1415.
436. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Impact of the Proposed California Civil Rights Initiative,
23 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. - (1995).
437. Joe R. Feagin & Nikitah Imani, Racial Barriers to African American Entrepreneur-
ship: An Exploratory Study, 41 Soc. PROBS. 562 (1994).
438. Id.
439. See id. at 568-70.
440. See id. at 570-75.
UNDERSTANDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
ployers discriminate with late payments, racial epithets, and harass-
ment.441 Government officials act in collusion with white contractors
and issue unfair performance evaluations. 442 Banks and insurance
companies discriminatorily reject blacks for loans and bonds and im-
pose higher rates and prices.443 White suppliers impose higher prices
or simply refuse to deal. 4
When affirmative action programs are used to create economic
opportunities for women and minority-owned firms, they often come
under heavy political attack. For example, when the Resolution Trust
Company began hiring law firms to represent it to recover assets from
banks it took over, it found it was retaining almost exclusively white
male-owned firms. As a result of vigorous efforts to find minority-
and women-owned law firms with expertise in banking and liquidation
work, and push points to retain more such women and minority-
owned firms, it was able to increase its minority and female participa-
tion to 13% of the total dollar value of its work. Although that left
87% of the legal work for firms in which a majority of the ownership
was by white men, the program was heavily criticized as using unfair
and unwarranted preferences. 445
Another problem that contributes to the exclusion of minority
group members from economic opportunity, and to racial segregation
in housing, is insurance redlining-refusing to issue insurance to resi-
dents of certain areas. In a study of homeowner's insurance under-
writing in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the authors found a substantial link
between the ability to purchase insurance, the quality of insurance,
and race." 6 Essentially, private insurers avoided largely minority
neighborhoods. If residents of such neighborhoods were able to
purchase insurance, it was likely to be through a government-spon-
sored insurance plan offering a less comprehensive policy.447 The au-
thors found that "the racial effect remains substantial even after
controlling for variables such as income level, poverty status, age of
housing, and turnover rates-factors that the financial industry has
441. See id. at 575-77.
442. See id. at 577-78.
443. See id. at 578-80.
444. Id. at 580-81.
445. See Benjamin Wittes, RTC Affirmative Action Bids Farewell, RECORDER, July 22,
1995, at 1, 6.
446. Gregory D. Squires & William Velez, Insurance Redlining and the Transformation
of an Urban Metropolis, 23 URB. AMi. Q. 63, 74 (1987).
447. See id.
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argued are the key indicators of the relative risk associated with indi-
viduals and neighborhoods.""'
As Squires and Velez suggest,
The relatively greater difficulty in obtaining insurance in minor-
ity communities has several implications. Home ownership be-
comes more difficult in those areas. Property values are lower
as a result. Consequently, individuals accumulate less equity in
their homes. Over time, such areas become less attractive for
investment, so private investors, including insurance companies,
allocate their capital elsewhere. Such uneven development is
exacerbated when scarce public dollars follow the flow of pri-
vate dollars, leading to further deterioration of municipal serv-
ices in urban communities." 9
On the consumer side of the business aisle, women and minority
group members often pay more than white men for the same product.
For example, a 1991 study revealed that sellers of new cars demand
higher prices from white women than they do from white men, higher
prices from blacks than whites, and the very highest prices from black
women.450 The differences are not small. In a test of ninety Chicago
car dealerships using 180 test teams, the author found that white men
were offered cars at an average price of $362 over the cost to the
dealer, white women at $504 over cost, black men at $783 over cost,
and black women at $1,237 over cost.451 Comparing the initial offers,
white men were asked to pay $818 over dealer cost, white women
were asked to pay $829 over dealer cost, black men were asked to pay
$1,534 over dealer cost, and black women were asked to pay $2,169
over dealer cost.452 The author estimates that the added costs to
blacks from price discrimination could total $150,000,000 annually for
new car sales alone.453 Once the car is purchased, race also plays a
significant role in the cost of insuring it. Prior to the passage of a
recent insurance reform initiative, residents of primarily black and
Hispanic neighborhoods in California typically paid almost twice as
448. Id. at 73.
449. Id at 75.
450. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotia-
tions, 104 HARV. L. REv. 817 (1991).
451. Id. at 828 tbl. 1. In additional tests using 400 similar negotiations, these results
were largely confirmed: white women were asked to pay $211 more than white men, black
women were asked to pay $397 more, and black men were asked to pay $1,022 more. Id.
at 828 n.36.
452. Id. at 832 tbl. 2.
453. IL at 823 n.18.
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much for auto insurance as residents of primarily white
neighborhoods." 4
Although the evidence of economic discrimination against blacks
is overwhelming, it is not widely acknowledged by whites. In respond-
ing to the Brodie survey, the white participants were almost evenly
split when asked whether most blacks have the same standard of living
and opportunities as whites (47%) or a lower standard of living and
fewer opportunities than whites (51 %).455 And when framed entirely
in terms of economic opportunity, 68% of the white respondents be-
lieved that blacks have the same or more opportunity to be "really
successful and wealthy," compared to 31% who believe blacks have
less opportunity.456
G. Crime
Of all the areas of American society in which minority group
members face discrimination, the most significant may be the criminal
justice system, which is widely recognized to be infected with racial
discrimination at every stage of the process. On any given day in
1994, 30.2% of black men aged 20-29 were under the control of the
criminal justice system, either through jail, prison, probation or pa-
role.41 7 By comparison, the "control rate" for the Hispanic population
of the same age was 12.3%, and for whites it was a mere 6.7%.458 In
1989, the "control rate" for young black males was 23.0%, and the
rate for young Hispanic males was 10.4%.11 Consequently, while the
overall population of the United States is approximately 12% black,
the prison population is over 45% black. 460 Among new inmates ad-
mitted to prison in 1994, almost three quarters were either black or
Hispanic.461
454. Gary Williams, "The Wrong Side of the Tracks": Territorial Rating and the Setting
of Automobile Liability Insurance Rates in California, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 845, 849-
52 (1992).
455. BRODIE, supra note 217, at 81.
456. Id. at 77.
457. MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIvE YEARS LATER 3 tbl. 1 (1995).
458. Id
459. Id at 5 tbl. 3.
460. HACKER, supra note 260, at 236.
461. Fox Butterfield, More in U.S. Are in Prison, Report Says-Number of Inmates at
the End of 1994 Has Tripled Since 1980, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1995, at A7. The arrest rate
for blacks in 1992 was five times higher than the arrest rate for whites (3,929.4 per 100,000
compared to 792.6 per 100,000). See also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIsTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICs-1993, at 422 tbl. 4.5 (1994)
[hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
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The main reason for the increase in the incarceration of young
blacks is increased and discriminatory enforcement of the drug laws.
In 1983, there were 57,975 incarcerated drug offenders; by 1993 there
were 353,564.462 Although blacks constitute approximately 13% of all
American drug users,4 63 they make up 35% of those arrested for drug
possession, 55% of those convicted of drug possession, and 74% of
those imprisoned for drug possession. 464 Another 16% of those incar-
cerated for drug use are Hispanic.4 65
One major reason for this disparity in drug use incarceration is
that while the police rarely arrest middle-class white drug users, they
arrest middle-class black drug users as frequently as "underclass"
black drug users.4 66 Another reason is the way in which the criminal
justice system treats crack cocaine. Crack cocaine, which is more
likely to be used by blacks and other minority group members than
powder cocaine or other illicit drugs,467 is the only drug that carries a
mandatory prison sentence for mere possession.468 Possession of
crack cocaine carries a federal sentence mandatory minimum of five
years in prison.4 69 Similar possession of powder cocaine carries no
mandatory minimum, and a maximum sentence of one year in
prison.470 Thus, young black crack cocaine users are subjected to far
harsher punishment than young white cocaine users.
The difference in treatment of minority and white cocaine users is
further exacerbated by arrest and prosecution decisions. While blacks
make up an estimated 38% of the users of crack cocaine, they consti-
tuted 84.5% of federal crack possession convictions in 1993,471 and
90% of those convicted in 1994.472 By contrast, although almost half
of all crack users are white, only 3.5% of those convicted for posses-
sion in 1994 were white.473 In 1995, the United States Sentencing
Commission proposed the elimination of the five-year mandatory
462. See Mauer & Huling, supra note 457, at 11 tbl. 5.
463. Id. at 9.
464. Id. at 12 fig. 1.
465. Id. at 13 tbl. 6.
466. See Id at 9.
467. An estimated 38% of crack cocaine users are black. Id at 11. An estimated 54%
of crack cocaine users are non-white. See Jeffrey Abramson, Making The Law Colorblind,
N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 16, 1995, at All.
468. Charisse Jones, Crack and Punishment Is Race the Issue?, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 28,
1995, § 1, at 1, 9.
469. Abramson, supra note 467, at All.
470. Id.
471. See Mauer & Huling supra note 457, at 11.
472. Jones, supra note 468, at 9.
473. Id.
minimum sentence for crack cocaine possession and treating crack
and powder cocaine the same, arguing that the distinction was racially
discriminatory, but Congress rejected the proposal.474
Among the fifteen American cities with the largest black popula-
tions, none have proportional representation of African Americans on
their police force. 475 The result is mostly white police forces patrolling
largely black and Hispanic neighborhoods. In their treatment of non-
white residents, the police are not only more likely to arrest them than
they are whites, they are also more likely to exercise their authority to
shoot them. Several studies have found that the percentage of police
shootings involving black victims far exceeds the percentage of blacks
in the population.476 Although a debate has raged over whether the
higher proportion of blacks shot by the police reflects police bias or
higher black criminal activity, a landmark study of shootings by the
Memphis police revealed that blacks were at far greater risk of being
shot by police than can be explained by either their proportion of the
general population or their proportion of arrests.477 The study found
the death rate by police shooting of unarmed non-assaultive black
men was eighteen times higher than the comparable white death
rate.478
Another place where racial bias is revealed in the criminal justice
system is the discretionary decision by prosecutors on how to charge
crimes. A number of studies reveal that in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, race plays a significant role. For example, a
study conducted on over 33,000 felony cases charged in Los Angeles
County found that black men were 50% more likely to be prosecuted
for serious crimes than were white men, and Hispanic men were even
more likely to be prosecuted than were black men.479 Of those white
men arrested, 26% were prosecuted, while 39% of black arrestees
were prosecuted, as were 42% of Hispanic arrestees.8 °
Nationally, among those arrested in 1991 for juvenile delin-
quency, the likelihood of detention prior to juvenile court disposition
474. Id.
475. HACKER, supra note 260, at 236.
476. See generally James J. Fyfe, Blind Justice: Police Shootings in Memphis, 73 J. OF
CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 707 (1982) (collecting studies).
477. Id. at 720.
478. Itt
479. Cassia Spohn et al., The Impact of the Ethnicity and Gender of Defendants on the
Decision to Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 175, 176, 185 tbl. 2 (1987).
480. Id at 185 tbl. 2.
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was over 50% greater for black children than for white children.481
Black children were almost twice as likely to be bound over to adult
court and tried as adults.48 2
Once charged, a criminal defendant will often be offered an op-
portunity to plead to a lesser offense, or "plea bargain." A study of
California judges, prosecutors and public defenders revealed that 16%
of judges and 68% of public defenders believed that race or ethnicity
effects the outcome of a plea bargain.483 Responding to a differently
worded question, 34% of the judges and 89% of the public defenders
agreed that racial bias is at least a little evident in the plea bargaining
process.4
A two-year study conducted for the National Institute of Correc-
tions examined all cases of prison inmates in California, Michigan and
Texas for the year 1978.485 The study found that whites were more
likely to be able to plea bargain, were less likely to be sentenced to
prison if convicted, and served, on average, shorter prison sentences
than blacks or Hispanics.486 Among those whites convicted of crimes
in federal court in 1990, 76.6% were sentenced to prison.487 Among
blacks, 79.3% were sent to prison.48 8 In the state courts, the average
sentence for white felony offenders in 1990 was 45 months.48 9 For
blacks, it was 58 months.490 The disparity was particularly high for
rape. While white rapists were sentenced to an average of 98 months
in prison, black rapists were sentenced to 157 months.491 By 1991, the
average sentence in state court for whites was 63 months for all of-
fenses; for blacks, it was 74 months.492 A 1991 survey of 34 states,
focusing on the amount of time served by prisoners before their first
481. The rate was 17.3% for whites, 26.2% for blacks. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 461, at
549 tbl. 5.78.
482. Id.
483. SAN JOSE MERCURY NEws, SUMMARY OF RESULTS: CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SURVEY, 8 (1991).
484. Id
485. Joan Petersilia, Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System: A Summary, 31
CRIME & DELINO. 15 (1985).
486. Id. at 21 tbl. 2, 22 tbl. 3.
487. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 461, at 493 tbl. 5.21.
488. Id.
489. Id. at 538 tbl. 5.61.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CORREC.
TIONS REPORTING PROGRAM, 1991, at 17 tbl. 1-10 (1994).
release from prison, confirmed that blacks served more time than
whites.493
In the area of race and the death sentence, a study by Keil and
Vito examined all 407 cases in which a person was charged, indicted,
convicted and sentenced for murder in the State of Kentucky between
the years 1976 and 1986.494 The authors found that "race is inextrica-
bly bound up with the way in which the capital sentencing process
operates. '495 Prosecutors were far more likely to seek the death pen-
alty for blacks who killed whites than in any other racial combina-
tion.496 In almost half the cases (22 of 45) in which a black person was
charged with killing a white person, the prosecutor sought the death
penalty.4 97 When a white person was charged with killing another
white person, the prosecutor sought the death penalty just over one
fourth of the time (72 of 273). 498 When a black person was charged
with killing another black person, the death penalty was sought less
than one time in six (12 of 75).499 And in no case in which a white
person was charged with killing a black person did the prosecutor seek
the death penalty (0 of 14).500 When the "seriousness" of the murder
was taken into account (whether the victim was a stranger, whether
the defendant was a deliberate killer, and whether the defendant had
a history of violence) the racial bias in the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion remained.5 0
A similar study of all 413 Florida cases in which a person was
sentenced to death between 1976 through 1987 yielded similar re-
sults.50 2 Among defendants convicted of killing whites, blacks were
more than twice as likely as whites to be sentenced to death." 3
Although the population of the United States is approximately 12%
black, 40% of all American prisoners on death row were black by the
end of 1992.5°
493. See id at 76 tbl. 6.9, 77 tbl. 6-10.
494. Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, Race, Homicide Severity, and Application of
the Death Penalty: A Consideration of the Barnett Scale, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 511 (1989).
495. Id. at 528.





501. See id at 520-21.
502. Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and
the Death Penalty in Florida, 43 FLA. L. REv. 1 (1991).
503. Id at 22.
504. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 461, at 666 tbl. 6.109.
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In a 1991 California survey, 14% of the judges and 76% of the
public defenders questioned disagreed with the statement, "Race/
ethnicity has no effect on the length of sentence imposed in criminal
cases," 50 5 and 16% of the judges and 77% of the public defenders dis-
agreed with the statement, "Race/ethnicity has no effect on the type of
sentence imposed in criminal cases.- 50 6
Viewers of L.A. Law could be excused for thinking that many of
the judges imposing criminal sentences were themselves minority
group members. Popular culture often depicts large numbers of mi-
nority judges, but in truth there are few. A 1995 survey conducted for
the California Judicial Council revealed that in California, where the
white population is 57%, nearly 90% of the Superior Court judges are
white.5 7 At the federal level, of the 438 judges appointed between
1981 and 1992, 398 of them (over 90%) were white, 17 were black, 21
were Hispanic, 2 were Asian, and only 50 were women.50 8
Minority group members interact with the criminal justice system
as victims as well as defendants. In a study on segregation and crime,
Douglas S. Massey writes: "blacks are far more likely to be crime
victims than are whites. Black teenagers are eleven times more likely
to be shot to death and nine times more likely to be murdered than
their white counterparts."50 9 In a study examining the link between
racial segregation and black homicide deaths in 125 central cities,
Massey and other social scientists found that "black-white segregation
was by far the most important variable in explaining inter-city varia-
tion in the black murder rate, dwarfing the effect of control factors
such as income inequality, poverty, education, occupation, age compo-
sition, population size, and region. '510 Between 1974 and 1992, the
assault victimization rate for whites has been stable-in 1974 it was
24.8 per 1,000 population, and in 1992 it was 24.6 per 1,000.111 By
contrast, for black assault victims, the rate has risen from 23.5 per
1,000 (less than the white rate) to 33.5 per thousand.5"2
505. SAN JOSE MERCURY NEws, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JusTICE SURVEY, supra note
483, at 7.
506. Id. at 8.
507. AR ASSOCIATES, RACIAL AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE CALIFORNIA TRIAL
COURTS, A REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RACIAL AND
ETHNIC BIAS IN THE COURTS, draft at app. B (1995).
508. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 461, at 72 tbl. 1.63.
509. Massey, supra note 368, at 1205.
510. Id. at 1209.
511. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 461, at 272 tbl. 3.28.
512. Id.
H. Poverty
In a society in which wealth and status are inextricably bound, the
link between race and poverty is undeniable. The United Nations has
reported that if the black and white populations of the United States
were considered separate nations, white America would rank first in
the world in wealth, while black America would rank thirty-first. 13
In 1992, 38.1% of black families and 30.3% of Hispanic families
had less than $15,000 in annual income, compared to only 13.8% of
white families.5 14 Between 1989 and 1992, a period in which all fami-
lies saw a drop in income,5 15 the drop was more severe for black and
Hispanic families than for white families.516 The median annual in-
come for 1992 reveals that black families had a median income of
$21,161, compared to $23,901 for Hispanic families, and $38,909 for
white families.517 For the same year, 42.6% of black families and
35.4% of Hispanic families had an income level that placed them in
the bottom 20% of all households, as compared to 16.8% of white
households.518
While unemployment may account for some of the difference in
income between whites and minorities, unemployment does not tell
the whole story. Among male, year-round, full-time workers, blacks
and Hispanics had much lower median incomes than did whites in
1992: $22,942 for blacks, $20,312 for Hispanics, and $31,737 for
whites.5 19 Among female year-round, full-time workers, 26.9% of the
black women and 36.6% of the Hispanic women had earnings below
the federal poverty line.5 20
While income differences certainly indicate that minorities con-
tinue to face economic disadvantages relative to white people, differ-
ences in wealth are even more stark. In 1991, white households had
nearly ten times the median net worth of black families, and over
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eight times the net worth of Hispanic households . 21 The typical white
American household in the pre-retirement years of 51-61 has $17,300
in assets while the typical black family in the same pre-retirement
years has $500 in assets, and four out of ten have no assets at all.522
By examining who became poor and who left poverty in 1992, the
Census Bureau has determined that blacks were only half as likely as
whites to leave poverty, and more than twice as likely to enter pov-
erty.52 3 Hispanics were one and a half times as likely to leave poverty,
and again over twice as likely to enter poverty.524 The chronic poverty
rate for whites was just 3%; it was 12% for Hispanics and 16% for
blacks .525
Poverty hits minorities perhaps most severely at the beginning
and at the end of their lives. Of people over 65, one third of blacks,
and 22% of Hispanics lived below the poverty line in 1992, compared
with 10.9% of whites. 26 Similarly, of children under six over 50% of
blacks, and 44% of Hispanics, lived below the poverty line in 1992,
compared to 14.4% of whites.527 Although the national population is
12% black and 9.5% Hispanic, among households suffering from hun-
ger 29.4% are black and 13.7% Hispanic. 528 It is axiomatic that no
child should go hungry. It is obscene that we can predict which chil-
dren will go hungry based on their race.
V. Conclusion
The work of social scientists chronicled herein is strong evidence
of pervasive unconscious racism within our society. For one perspec-
tive on how close it lies to the surface of consciousness, consider the
statement of a Boston-area psychiatrist, as reported by Jonathan
Kozol:
When they [his suburban neighbors] hear of all these murders,
all these men in prison, all these women pregnant with no hus-
bands, they don't buy the explanation that it's poverty, or public
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holds it was $4,604 and for Hispanic households it was $5,345. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,
supra note 287, at 482 tbl. 742.
522. See Keith Bradsher, Rich Americans Tend To Earn It, New Study Finds, S.F.
CHRON., July 25, 1995, at A2.
523. ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMIN., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
BRmF No. 95-20, POVERTY'S REVOLVING DOOR 1 (1995).
524. Id
525. Id at 2.
526. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 287, at 476 tbl. 731.
527. Id at 476 tbl. 729.
528. COMMUNITY CHILDHOOD HUNGER IDENTIFICATION PROJECT, supra note 396, at
14 tbl. 2.1.
UNDERSTANDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
schools, or racial segregation. They say, 'We didn't have much
money when we started out, but we led clean and decent lives.
We did it. Why can't they?' I try to get inside that statement.
So I ask them what they mean. What I hear is something that
sounds very much like a genetic answer: 'They don't have it.'
What they mean is lack of brains, or lack of drive, or lack of
willingness to work. Something like that. Whatever it is, it
sounds almost inherent. Some of them are less direct. They
don't say genetics; what they talk about is history. 'This is what
they have become, for lots of complicated reasons. Slavery, in-justice or whatever.' But they really do believe it when they say
that this is what they have become, that this is what they are.
And they don't believe that better schools or social changes will
affect it very much. So it comes down to an explanation that is
so intrinsic, so immutable, that it might as well be called genetic.
They see a slipshod deviant nature-violence, lassitude, a reck-
less sexuality, a feverish need to over-reproduce-as if it were a
character imprinted on black people. The degree to which this
racial explanation is accepted would surprise you. 529
Since 1978, the Supreme Court has continually affirmed that af-
firmative action is an appropriate remedy for discrimination in em-
ployment, contracting, and school admissions. Although the Court
has required significant proof of discrimination before permitting
race- or sex-conscious decisionmaking, particularly by the govern-
ment, and has further insisted that voluntary quotas not be permitted
and that affirmative action plans be limited in time and scope, it none-
theless permits such plans to operate when these criteria are met.530
We now face a move to end affirmative action. It is premised on
three false foundations: first, that affirmative action permits the use
of quotas and the selection of unqualified persons for jobs, contracts
and school admissions; second, that discrimination against white men
is common, and that the cause of such discrimination is affirmative
action; and third, that discrimination against women and minority
group members is no longer a serious social problem. I hope that this
Article has successfully demonstrated that each of these premises is
demonstrably false.
We live in a society in which we who are white men are privileged
by our race and gender, and in which women and racial and ethnic
minority group members are subjected to widespread discrimination
which makes it far more difficult for them to succeed. Among the few
effective solutions to this vast social problem is the remedy of affirma-
tive action; the time has not yet come for it to be ended.
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